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Introduction 
  
««The world is in crisis». This sentence is common and has often been used to 
describe the dynamics of the global situation in different respects and moments of 
occurrence. Recently, this expression has become a daily ‘label’ of a historical 
moment which lasts at least for the past decades. In truth, the alarm does not seem to 
be completely unjustified. Indeed, beside the well-known issues that run from the 
Middle East question to the relations between East and West or to the development of 
post-colonial states, new occasions of threats and insecurities have appeared on the 
international scenario. Apart from their obvious contingent specificities, these 
challenges to the ‘quite flow’ of the global coexistence are not new in themselves and 
their cause, if not their logic, can be easily traced back and interpreted accordingly to 
past dynamics. Yet, what is new is the context in which they occur that shape the 
happening of both old and current issues in an original fashion. As Nelson Mandela 
noted:  
 
In the globalized world in which we live, events in one corner of the planet can have 
an immense effect upon the fortunes of others far away and not at all involved in 
those events […] This state of affairs should remind us that as we affect the fate of 
one another, we also have a common responsibility in the world […] Together, we 
all live in a global neighbourhood and […] we need a globalization of responsibility 
as well. Above all, that is the challenge of the next century1.             
 
On this background, the following dissertation deals with the evolution of the debate 
within the discipline of international relations. In particular, it focuses on the 
contemporary critique of the sovereignty criteria as guiding principle of organizing 
the international realm. Furthermore, the dissertation investigates the most recent 
discussions on the necessity of reforming the system of global governance and in this 
sense inquires the possibility of Cosmopolitan Democracy. Having in mind the new 
globalized world order, some scholars have in fact called for a radical change in 
approaching the global issues and requested a radical re-thinking of the global 
political organization of international relations. Their claims have being articulated in 
a political project that sets the path towards a Cosmopolitan Democracy. As Daniele 
                                                 
1N. Mandela, ‘The Challenge of the Next Century: The Globalization of Responsibility’, in NPQ: New 
Perspective Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 34-5, 2000.  
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Archibugi, one of the founders of Cosmopolitan Democracy, puts it, this political 
project may be intended as “the attempt to reconcile the globalization phenomenon 
with the success obtained by the democratic system. It takes its stances from the 
recognition that a state-based democracy, the only one we know until now, risks to be 
made empty by the processes of globalization”2.  
 
Basic premises: the question of inclusion and exclusion  
 
A fundamental dilemma challenges politics since its origin: the problem of how to 
deal with inclusion and exclusion. All political arrangements rest ultimately on a 
distinction between members and non-members. Thus, this fundamental question, 
taken in itself, says nothing about the nature of those arrangements, because all 
political asset rely upon this basic distinction. As consequence, it is not enough to 
address the question of inclusion and exclusion but, it is rather necessary to look 
within the concrete political arrangements to understand how the insider/outsider 
puzzle is effectively tackled.   
Almost 2300 years ago, first the Cynics and later the Stoics, regarded an ethical good 
life as one in which human rationality was made to conform to the rational order of 
nature. They elaborated the idea of the law of nature, that is, a universal moral law 
which corresponds to the rational capacities of all human beings. These human 
capacities of reasoning ultimately provided the grounds for fellowship in a world 
community. Contrary to the Cynics, the Stoics did not believe that this theory of 
virtue justified the abandoning of the public life. This was because human society was 
seen as an end of the individual’s moral duty. In other words, the Stoics considered 
that the human capacities for reasoning could be fully developed only within the 
society, and the freedom of the person required a harmonization of interests in the 
community. In this respect, the law performed the important function of providing a 
common standard for all, representing a rational ordering of life to which all could 
subject themselves. As consequence of this view, the Stoics ultimately recommended 
for the good of human beings to take part to the political life of the society. Despite 
the necessity of this commitment, their conception of the ideal political community 
overcame the limitations associated with concrete forms of government. In this way, 
                                                 
2D. Archibugi, ‘Sogni cosmopolitici e incubi mattutini’, in Sebastiano Maffettone e Gianfranco 
Pellegrino, Etica delle relazioni internazionali, Marco Editore, Cosenza, 2004, p.323 (my trans.) 
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they have offered a vision that transcended national borders and was inclusive of all 
persons. Yet, the Stoic philosophy remained little more than a general ethical world 
view which failed to offer any concrete conception of norms, agents, and institutions 
of a global political community.  
Crucially for the present discussion, starting from the modern era till the present days, 
the dominant answer to the central political question of inclusion and exclusion was 
rather different from the Stoics’ idea. In this respect, it has been certainly not for 
reasons of chance if the common sense currently shares that foreigners are different 
from our fellow nationals. In this sense, it is nowadays almost granted that ‘they’ have 
different claims upon us while ‘we’ have different obligations towards them. 
However, beyond the popular belief, such distinction is long-standing and well-
established in scholarly discourses on politics too and it has been associated with the 
idea of sovereign polities which claim to be autonomous from external influences. 
Although not in an straightforward way, this assertion also greatly influenced the 
debate concerning international relations and international theory. In particular, it 
decisively contributed to shape a clear distinction between international sphere and 
domestic realm. On the one hand, domestic politics was seen as a context where 
questions of political obligations towards co-nationals were central. Social life was, in 
fact, considered impossible without this fact being recognized. International relations, 
on the other hand, concerned relationships between states, and realism, the most 
important theory dealing with the inter-state relationship, stressed the extent to which 
whatever obligations states had towards each other rested ultimately on contingent 
factors, most importantly mutual self-interest. Although it was only during the inter-
war years, and more importantly, after the Second World War, that international 
relations came to be seen as a distinct field of study with its own concepts and 
theories, for much of the last century this separation was more or less taken for 
granted by scholars. In particular, the most recent discipline of international relations 
focuses on the assumption of the so-called “Democratic Peace” thesis which states 
that democratic regimes do not fight against each other3. According to a causal logic 
that goes from the internal to the external realm, the supporters of this theory have 
                                                 
3M. Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs’, in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol.12, 
No.3 and 4, 1983, pp.205-235 and 323-354; B. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1993; B. Russet and J. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, 
Interdependence, and International Organizations, Norton, New York, 2001.  
 5
thus drawn a strong connection between the nature of the domestic order and the 
concrete peaceful respect of international obligations.  
Yet, over the last thirty years, a distinctive discourse has emerged which, contrary to 
‘classical’ international relations theory, does not treat this subject as a separate matter 
from political science, and which refuses to think of issues of obligation as falling 
naturally into categories such as domestic and international. The creators of this 
discourse come from, and sometimes consider themselves still to be located in a 
variety of backgrounds in political and social theory, moral philosophy, economics, 
and international relations. But, all together, they have made of international relations 
something new so that the term ‘International Political Theory’ is often employed to 
describe this new approach and distinguish it from classical international relations 
theory4. The main point of these authors is that the political doctrine of sovereignty 
rests on process of exclusion and inclusion which may, and actually does, cut across 
considerations of right and justice5. The sovereignty system imposes, in fact, a 
particular form of inclusion and exclusion which has dramatic consequences because 
it encourages a particular mode of thinking about the world in which notions of right 
and justice are parochialized.  
Following the critical current of International Political Theory, Cosmopolitan 
Democracy assumes that such clear distinction between domestic and international 
sphere cannot be sustained anymore. Both these domains have to be judged according 
to the same standard provided by the notion of democracy, in particular according to 
the principles of non-violence, popular control and political equality6. Furthermore, 
the strengthening of the processes of globalization which took place in the last 
decades has enhanced the importance of the external factors in both qualitative and 
quantitative terms. This has decisively modified the ways in which power is exerted 
within all states. In the end, it is not enough to push on the side of the internal 
democratization if the logic of democracy and the rule of law are not extended 
internationally. The international system has in fact a direct and decisive influence on 
the nature of domestic regimes, although this nexus has not to be indeed in an 
                                                 
4For a deeper explanation of the difference between classical international relations theory and 
international political theory see., Chris Brown, Sovereignty, Rights and Justice, international political 
theory today, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2002, pp.11-14  
5See. R. B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1993. 
6D. Archibugi, Cittadini del mondo, verso una democrazia cosmopolitica, il Saggiatore, Milano 2009, 
pp.40-42 
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absolute sense. What Cosmopolitan democracy suggests is then a project of 
democratization which looks in both directions. This task does not at all require 
simply to export domestic models of democracy at the transnational level. More 
significantly, it demands the conceptualization and effective enforcement of suitable 
democratic strategies fitted with the new globalized context in which international 
relations currently take place.       
The idea of Cosmopolitan Democracy to extend democracy to both the domestic and 
global level certainly “marks a goal but it also suggests a route”. In this sense 
Archibugi wrote,  
 
the necessity of such a route is founded on the assumption that an ethical 
adhesion is developed that makes the citizens more and more participating of 
what happens to other individuals and communities even when those are 
geographically and culturally distant from their own. In fact, what draws up the 
destinies of peoples are not the interests, [but, rather, the human beings’ 
perception] of a feeling of solidarity that often crosses the state borders.7 
 
On this fundamental presumption of an ethical adhesion of all human beings, 
Cosmopolitan Democracy has given an answer to the basic problem of politics which 
decisively favors the improvement of the mechanisms of inclusion.  
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
The chapters of the thesis discuss a historical account of how politics has traditionally 
faced the founding question of inclusion and exclusion. In particular, most of the 
attention is paid to describe how the conventional division between domestic and 
international sphere has affected the models which have been developed to govern the 
relationships between states. In this way, a general explanation of the classical theory 
of international relations is provided. Then, in opposition to traditional reasoning, the 
argument of Cosmopolitan Democracy will be presented. 
The thesis is divided in two parts. Part 1. deals with the idea of the state as the centre 
of political authority. This notion is conventionally considered to represent the 
foundation of the modern era of politics. In this respect, chapter 1.1. describes the so-
                                                 
7D. Archibugi, ‘La Democrazia Cosmopolitica: Una Visione Partecipante’, in Rivista Italiana di 
Scienza Politica, Vol. 35, No. 2, August, 2005,  p. 264 
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called Westphalia System of sovereign states which, settled in 1648, is regarded as 
installing the ground rules of the European international order for the subsequent three 
centuries. The chapter gives an account of the notion of the state’s sovereignty 
according to the principle of no internal equals and no external superiors. 
Furthermore, it explains the two characteristic discourses associated with Westphalia, 
the ‘law of nation’ and the ‘society of states’.  
The subject of chapter 1.2. is instead centered on the international thought of the 
Enlightenment and Post-Enlightenment era. This is treated in three sections. In section 
a) the attention focuses on the Enlightenment and its strong cosmopolitan concern. In 
contrast to the notion of the society of states, the political thinkers of the time 
conceptualized the idea of a society of all human beings. Furthermore, from out of the 
opposition to the general view of the interstate-war as still a possible expression of the 
dynamics of the society of states, they gave rise to the tradition of the ‘Peace Project’. 
Many, if not most of the categories of contemporary political theory emerge one way 
or another from the Enlightenment. In this respect, the section investigates the work of 
the preeminent figure of the time, Immanuel Kant. In particular, it outlines some 
aspects of his thought which grandly influenced the way in which the debate on 
international relations and, crucially, Cosmopolitan Democracy, has been shaped. In 
section b) the chapter speaks of post-Enlightenment particularistic views of politics. It 
especially refers to the Romantic reaction to the Enlightenment, the account of the 
writers of the state and the nation, and the thought of Friederich Hegel. Finally, in 
section c) the main concern is the shift in the thought on international relations 
determined by Industrialization. It investigates the influence exerted by trade on the 
nature of international relations. In particular, it presents the argument developed by 
liberal political economy and the counter-assertions of neo-mercantilists and socialists 
theorists. The liberal assumption that trade favors peaceful relationships between 
states is still object of quarrel, particular in light of globalization and the current and 
generalized economic crisis.              
Chapter 1.3. is devoted to ‘realism’ and ‘liberal internationalism’, the two mainstream 
of international relations theory of twentieth century. The chapter is divided in two 
sections. In particular, the doctrine of liberal internationalism is presented in section 
a). After the end of First World War, this strain of thought worked out a plan for a 
new setting of international relations, relying upon the idea of a fundamental harmony 
of the people’s interests. Thus, granting wide trust to the force of world opinion, 
 8
liberal internationalism envisaged a new conception of diplomacy and a different 
institutional asset made concrete in the work of the League of Nations. After having 
illustrated this plan, the section highlights both the influence it exerted on the twenty 
first-century theory of international relations and its points of resonance with the 
Westphalia System, in particular on the prevalent role assigned to the state. In section 
b) the realist critique to liberal assumptions is described. Furthermore, the position of 
Rational Choice theory is presented, especially underlining its challenge to the 
common belief of the doctrine of international relations as a separate subject from 
political theory.  
Part 1. ends with an examination of self-determination and non-intervention, two key, 
but controversial norms of contemporary international relations. This is the content of 
chapter 1.4. which also raises some important questions related with these norms. In 
particular, with respect to self-determination, it analyzes the puzzle aspects of its 
relationship with democracy, while, as regards non-intervention, it enquires the hard 
distinction between intervention and influence.  
In Part 2., the problems raised in Part 1. will receive an answer according to the 
perspective of Cosmopolitan Democracy. Moreover, Part 2. examines the 
presumptions of this approach to global politics and the main points of its proposal. It 
further highlights the consequent implications of this perspective for the manner in 
which questions are faced within contemporary international political theory. On this 
suggestions, it finally presents concrete proposals for an effective reform of the 
current system of global governance. 
Chapter 2.1. takes into account the historical evolution of the political organization of 
human beings. In this respect, it notices the improvement of the mechanisms of 
decisional participation settled to respond to the problem of inclusion and exclusion. 
Within the state boundaries this process has been successfully brought to high levels 
through the constant development of the democratic regime. Even in the relations 
between states we have attended at a certain affirmation of the rule of law. This was 
first embedded in the idea of the ‘concert of states’, then, developed in the ‘League of 
Nations’, and currently it is encompassed in the UN Charter. At the same time, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights marked the recognition of the individual as a 
legitimate subject of political concern. However, outside the borders the results are 
more ambiguous and certainly not democratic.  
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In this respect, Chapter 2.2. deals with the problem of the democratization of the 
world arrangement. With particular regard to the contemporary UN apparatus, David 
Held and Anthony McGrew have emphasized the distance between the stated goals of 
global governance and the reality of the evolution of international affairs. As a matter 
of fact, since the end of the Second World War and the advent of the UN Charter 
great attention has been paid on providing a body of norms and institutions to protect 
human security and development. But contrary to the declared intentions, we have 
attended at the constant spread of both global inequalities and social exclusion along 
with the escalation of several military conflicts8. The discourse is further extended to 
encompass what the supporters of Cosmopolitan Democracy term ‘the democratic 
deficit’ of global governance.  
Aiming at both corroborating this general depiction and showing on concrete case 
studies the on-going international situation, chapter 2.3. presents a reading of some 
events of the latest evolution of the political world context. In particular, it focalizes 
on recent cases of conflict and the contemporary economic crisis. The account aims to 
make evident the failure of the actual system of global governance as a means for 
maintaining a peaceful world order and securing human freedom, development and 
well-being. The chapter is divided in two sections. In section a) the analysis of some 
of the most recent political events is developed. There are three the main objects of 
concern here. First, the policy of ‘war on terror’ developed by the former US 
President George W. Bush together with some puzzling aspects of the new policy of 
the president-elect Barack Obama. Secondly, the 2008 ‘Cast Lead’ military operation 
of Israel in the Gaza Strip and, finally, the 2008 Russian intervention in Georgia in the 
regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This depiction aims at showing that, as 
observed among others by Jürgen Habermas, beside the state-centered logic, a 
problematic unilateral and nationalistic approach to international issues is currently 
taking place. As consequence, Hayden noticed, “any role that global governance can 
have in achieving human development through poverty reduction and the provision of 
both welfare and human security often is marginalized by the self-interested 
considerations of the realist power system”.9 Moreover, as described in section b), in 
the most recent time, the contemporary economic crisis brings up strong concerns 
                                                 
8D. Held and A. McGrew, ‘The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction’, in David Held and 
Anthony McGrew (eds.), The Global Transformations Reader, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 14  
9Patrick Hayden, Cosmopolitan Global Politics, Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2005, p. 24 
 10
even on the real success of the global economic promotion. At the same time, it 
confirms the validity of the illustration of Held and McGrew on “how the current 
system of global governance privilege its market enhancing functions over its market 
correcting ones”10. More significantly, it imposes with greater strength the urgency of 
finding an answer to the question of the ‘democratic deficit’ of global governance 
raised by the advocates of Cosmopolitan Democracy. 
In chapter 2.4. the central question of the relationship between the domestic and 
international realm receives an answer according to the perspective of Cosmopolitan 
Democracy. In light of this depiction and in a critical mood towards the Democratic 
Peace thesis, the chapter also makes some considerations on the connection between 
democracy and the global system.  
Chapter 2.5. describes the institutional architecture of Cosmopolitan Democracy as 
conceived by Daniele Archibugi. Specific attention is here paid to the attempt to 
revitalize the Kantian tripartition though the division of political management in 
different levels, from the local to the global. It is also here investigated the plan of 
Cosmopolitan Democracy for the replacement of the principle of sovereignty with a 
new global constitutionalism. Moreover, it deals with the emergence of new political 
subjects. Multinational corporations, global movements and the same international 
organizations work across the borders and outside of a simple state-based logic. In 
particular, the global movements develop an ever more significant transnational 
participation of the world citizens to the global affairs. In this respect, the chapter 
raises the fundamental problem of their legitimation. 
Finally, the conclusion addresses some objections raised against the project of 
Cosmopolitan Democracy. These are critiques which are directed at the very basis of 
the thought on Cosmopolitan Democracy. They are divided in three categories. The 
first set of counter-assertions is mainly sustained by the realists who regard 
Cosmopolitan Democracy as a political impossibility. The second order of complains 
refers to the transnational democracy as being a too-high-time-demanding plan 
destined to lose itself in the remote future. Finally, the last groups of objections 
contest that a global civil society does not exist and on this ground they challenge the 
proposals of Cosmopolitan Democracy.  
        
                                                 
10Held and McGrew, footnote n.8, p.14 
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«The world is in crisis». Today, more than ever, we are haunted by this grave 
and apparently inescapable certainty. As such, the same idea of crisis commonly 
evokes moments of perturbation, difficulty, suffering. Yet, it represents more simply a 
sudden modification of a no-more-sustainable morbid state that in such a way asks for 
an urgent intervention. In this perspective, it may be said that it is the work of the man 
that turns against its master, shouts ‘that’s enough’, and obliges him to rebuild. Once 
endangered in this light, a crisis appears not only as a defeat but also as an opportunity 
for a more profitable general rearrangement. In fact, in such critical circumstances, 
they are not only the certainties of the individuals to be weakened, but also the ties 
that hold together the structures of consolidated power. In similar cases, then, it is 
necessary to avoid states and individual to be pushed by the dismay towards both 
forms of nationalistic closures and populist and authoritarian policies. Nevertheless, 
“repeating that the strength is the main source of political legitimacy it not enough, it 
is necessary to wonder if the strength is tameable”11. In this respect, the modest 
opinion of the author of this dissertation joins those of more authoritative scholars that 
the project for Cosmopolitan Democracy is at the same time the best approach to 
firmly maintain this intent and move closer to an effective realization.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11Archibugi, footnote n. 2, p.330 (my trans.) 
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1.  The sovereign state as the centre of  political power  
 
The discourse of (Western) political theory, over the last three or four hundred years, 
has been associated with the idea of sovereign states that are legally autonomous, 
territorial, political entities which are “hard shelled”, with clearly defined and 
effective borders, but which engage in regular, systematized relations one with 
another12. The next chapter will be devoted to describe the international architecture 
drawn from this conception which is commonly defined as the ‘Westphalia System’ 
of sovereign states. Then, it will be given an account of the theoretical developments 
that took place in international relations debate starting from this arrangement.    
 
 
1.1 The Westphalia System 
 
In the 1648 the Treaties of Munster and Osnabruck were signed, bringing to an 
end, at least nominally, the Thirty Years War in Germany. These treaties which taken 
together are known as the Peace of Westphalia are conventionally believed to 
inaugurate a new era of international relations commonly defined as the ‘Westphalia 
System’ of sovereign states. The Westphalian territorial state involved a double-
headed notion of sovereignty; rulers were sovereign in so far they accepted no internal 
equals and no external superiors, and to get to this point the medieval claims of 
universal rulers had to be undermined. But in this respect the Peace of Westphalia was 
not of great significance because the power of the Emperor had been already divorced 
from ideational factors. More important in this sense was the Peace of Augsburg of 
1555, which brought to an end the first series of wars of religion in Germany. There 
was established the famous principle of cuius regio ejuis religio according to which 
the ruler was entitled to enforce religious uniformity within his realm. This represents 
the key break with the medieval political practice. The significance of the Peace of 
Westphalia is thus not so much that it established new principles, rather that after the 
1648 challenges to the principles set up over the previous century became very few. In 
short, the universal claims of church and empire were no more significant, although 
the latter would continue until ended by Napoleon a century later.  
                                                 
12Brown, footnote n. 4, p.21  
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The notion of sovereignty as absolute power was not a characteristic of the medieval 
thought. Practical feudal politics are indeed all about the dispersal of power. They 
were supportive of mixed forms of government and opposed to any concentration of 
power, much less territorially based. The only exception to the medieval rejection of 
the notion of sovereignty as absolute power concerned the sovereignty of God. Yet, 
the main factor which contributed to reshape the discourse on sovereignty stemmed 
from a different source, namely the reception of Roman political and legal thought 
associated with the Renaissance and the rise of humanism13. The Roman tradition was 
significant in two important respects. First, the Roman legal notion of property was 
highly influential. For the Romans property was indeed absolute. If you owned 
something that meant it was up on you to do what you like with that property, unless 
you used it to harm someone else. This is completely different from the feudal notion 
of property which cannot be disposed of without the approval of the overlord. The 
point about the Roman notion of property – dominium – is that it provides a model of 
sovereignty for the new princes of the Westphalia era. In this sense, the new 
sovereigns regarded their territories as their property, and the system as a whole as a 
system of property ownership14. This meant that they claimed the right to do what 
they wanted within their territory without external interference and as property-
owners they also defended in principle the right of other property-owners to do what 
they wanted with their property.  
The Roman influence was also significant in a second respect. For the medievals, 
influenced by the Greek thought and, especially, notions of natural law, violence 
between political communities was always regrettable, although it may occasionally 
be necessary. Essentially, if and only if the innocent were protected and there was a 
reasonable prospect that, by violence and in no other way, a wrong could be righted. 
The ‘Just War’ theorized by Aquinas and others reinforced this account which, 
however, was believed to be endorsed by philosophical authorities such as Plato and 
Aristotle, as well as by the requirements of Christianity. The Romans saw things 
rather differently. The Roman Republic was an expansionist entity and what 
constituted a sufficient reason for war was defined very loosely. In particular, a pre-
emptive war was justified. In this respect, Richard Tuck noted that during the 
sixteenth century and beyond a contest took place between natural lawyers, who 
                                                 
13J. Carroll, Humanism, Fontana Press, London, 1993;  
14F. Kratochwil, ‘Sovereignty as a Dominion: Is there a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?’, in Lyons 
and Mastanduno, 1995. 
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supported the traditional notion of the common interest in peace and justice, and the 
humanists, who were more favorable to the claims of the new sovereign states15. In 
this context, he argued, Grotius, who is often identified as the father of international 
law, was supportive of the idea that the sovereign was entitled to make war if he 
thought it appropriated. Grotius was a natural lawyer but the foundations of natural 
law were for him to be found in the right of self-preservation and the right to own 
property. In other words, for Grotius, natural law is a morality that should be seen as 
based on coexistence between self-regarding individuals rather than founded on 
human sociality and the common good, except if the latter is defined as the mutual 
possession of the rights previously quoted16. Non-interference in each other’s affairs 
is the basic principle here. This precept is transferred by Grotius to international 
relations in The Law of War and Peace, one of the founding texts of the Westphalia 
System17. Thus, states have a right of self-defense in all circumstances, not simple a 
right of defense against a direct attack, but a more general right to preserve their 
security, which implied pre-emption and the right to punish offenders. Yet, another 
recognized founder of international law, Samuel Pufendorf, moved quite away from 
Grotius position. While accepting the shift of natural rights, Pufendorf stressed indeed 
the importance of duties as well rights including, crucially a duty of benevolence. The 
moral law, he asserted, cannot simply rest upon a selfish understanding of right. There 
must be some other factor if the relations between individuals and states, are not to be 
understood as taking place out of morality. These authors are commonly taken to be 
the founders of international law but they saw themselves rather as natural lawyers 
and their work on the relations between states emerged out of their wider interest in 
natural law. However, they were succeeded by figures who were much more directly 
concerned with the law of nations, the latter aimed at regulating the coexistence 
within a recognized ‘society of states’. In this respect, two main characters are 
Christian Wolff and Emmerich de Vattel. Wolff  applied natural law to nations, but 
considering this sphere as a separate branch of natural law. His major contribution is 
his conception of foundations of ‘international’ law through the construct of a 
universal state, a civita maxima. In the words of Terry Nardin, “we must imagine that 
states comprise a society governed by natural law, and that this natural society 
                                                 
15R. Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999 
16T. Nardin, Law, Morality and the Relations of States, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1983 
17H. Grotious, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, translated by A. C. Campbell, On the Law of War and Peace, 
London, 1814 
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constitutes a universal state”18. In this context, international law is an authoritative 
body of rules that govern the relations of states. Yet, in the absence of a real sovereign 
who could declare and interpret these rulers, it is necessary to posit a fictional 
collective sovereignty. Thus, the universal state holds “a kind of sovereignty over 
each state considered individually”19.Similarly, Vattel set out the law of nations, but 
he was also concerned with diplomatic practice. He is regarded as the one that better 
than any other has described in formal terms the nature of the Westphalia System and 
a key figure in the study of international society20. In this sense, the equality of states, 
the legitimacy of the balance of power, and the distinction between ius ad bellum and 
ius in bello are all central notions of Westphalian international political discourse that 
are absent in previous discussions, but present in Vattel’s work. The legal principle of 
sovereign equality is established by analogy with the natural equality of persons and 
reflects diplomatic practice and protocol. As result, the ruling princes as to consider 
each other as fraternal equals, irrespective of the size of their domains. This principle 
is protected against any hegemonic attempt of any other state through the balance of 
power that may be justly preserved even by preventive war. Yet, even in the actual 
case of the outbreak of a war, international law is not suspended. Legal equality 
implies that the law of war apply to all, regardless of issues of ius ad bellum. Thus, 
the soldiers of an unjust ruler are in any event as entitled to its protection  as those of a 
just. Vattel also provided the first defense of what would be known at the end of the 
twenty century as the ‘morality of states’. This approach posits that the states of the 
Westphalia System relate to each other in moral terms and not simply as fellow 
power-holders21. The natural law element remains thus present in Vattel’s approach 
because he is unwilling to base the foundations of international law simply on 
diplomatic customs and state treatises. There must be, he argued, some ground beyond 
this against which customs and treaties can be judged. After Vattel and during the 
following 200 years, this position was abandon and international law became a 
positive discourse made of codified state practices and treaties, reflecting what states 
did rather than providing a justification or a critique of their actions. The major figure 
of this period, who set out an account of international society in Vattelian terms, was 
Edmund Burke. He is an interesting figure in so far he linked the existence of a 
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society of states to a common cultural background. On his account, international 
society worked in the eighteenth century because the state-members shared a common 
cultural and religious background. Before the French Revolution, he argued, the states 
of Europe formed indeed one great republic ruled by a common system of laws and 
customs. Evidently here Wolff’s theoretical invention of a civita maxima is thought as 
it were real. This is what the Revolution has undermined, and hence intervention 
against it was justified. In this way, even if the French revolutions had been sincerely 
ready to commit themselves to the rules of international law, their commitment would 
have been of no value because they did not share the presuppositions upon which 
those rules were based. In the end, coexistence and non-intervention were possible 
only for those who share such presumptions. The real test for Burke’s position would 
have come when the European states system became a global system and 
multicultural. Yet, the main issue of his reflection of whether a system of co-existence 
may operate in a world where there are different conceptions of the Good is still 
source of puzzles and object of debate. In chapter 2 we will see how Cosmopolitan 
Democracy has answered to this puzzle. 
 
 
1.2. Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment Thought 
 
The transition to the Westphalian political order was accompanied by a 
progressively general acceptance of the legitimacy of a system of sovereign states. 
Yet, from the Enlightenment, this acceptance disappeared and a critical strain raised 
in international thought. Most of these figures considered the society of states as a 
poor substitute of a proper society of all human beings. Some thinkers, instead, 
accepted the basic idea of a system of independent units but wished to reshape these 
units according to a new principle, that of ‘nationality’. Finally, others scholars, 
influenced by the rise of industrialism, put their attention on material factors affirming 
the lack of fit between a system of independent states and an increasingly 
interdependent economy.  
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a) Cosmopolitanism and Kant  
 
For what concerns the first group of these intellectuals their identifying feature 
was a strong cosmopolitan commitment. The basic suggestion that accompanied the 
evolution of cosmopolitanism from its Hellenic roots until its modern version is a 
shift in the understanding of one’s fundamental political identity. Instead of defining 
the latter according to particular political units, these commentators stated the idea 
that one is a citizen of the whole world, regarding humanity as one’s fellows. 
However, it is interesting to notice that the main factor common to some of the 
authors previously quoted and to the Enlightenment as a whole was a cosmopolitan 
attitude coupled with the Westphalian division of the world into sovereign states. 
Thus, for example, Wolff and Vattel’s support to the principle of sovereignty was 
clearly anti-cosmopolitan, but the cosmopolitan element was present in the notion of a 
civita maxima. Nevertheless, the Enlightenment theorists of cosmopolitanism were 
not satisfied by the simple idea of a society of states because it implied the acceptance 
of the legitimacy of inter-states war which was still regarded as a destructive and 
horrifying force. From out of this rejection of war emerged the Enlightenment 
tradition of the ‘Peace Project’. In this respect, a more extended consideration of 
Kant’s work, so important for late twentieth-century cosmopolitanism, is required, 
since some of its conceptions are still fundamental for the development of the 
approach of Cosmopolitan Democracy.  
Kant’s attention to international relations is what made him one of the most important 
thinkers of the Enlightenment. This is also the reason why he remains a central figure 
in the progress of contemporary international political theory, as in the context of 
Cosmopolitan Democracy. Whereas Hobbes, Locke and even Rousseau shaped their 
political account within bounded polities and, then, dealt with the relations between 
them starting from these particular entities, Kant adopted a radically different 
approach. His thoughts on international relations are in fact fundamental in his 
thoughts on politics in general. Such way of reasoning supported his greater aspiration 
to formulate a coherent and consistent account of the moral and social world, taken as 
a whole, through the integration of the moral, legal and political sphere. At this aim, 
Kant provided an account of: the moral law to which individuals should conform in 
their personal behavior and in their social relations; the political framework needed 
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for social relations based on the moral law to take place; the relations between polities 
required if a moral life is to be possible.  
For what concerns Kant’s deontological moral theory, outlined in the Groundwork of 
the Metaphysics of Morals, this is based on his conception of ‘practical reason’. This 
is the rational human capacity of practical deliberation which, for him, constitutes the 
autonomous sources of moral principles and values. In other words, morality consists 
of the exercise by humans of their autonomous reason to choose principles of actions, 
in the forms of ‘maxims’, that reflect the demands of duty. Via the notion of practical 
reasoning, Kant drew thus a strong correlation between morality and individual 
freedom. The structure of this relation is revealed in the form of the imperative which 
characterizes the functioning of practical reasoning. In this respect, Kant distinguished 
between hypothetical imperatives and categorical imperatives. The former are 
commands concerning a course of action regarded as a means to some other end and, 
hence, they are conditional upon the end that is desired. While, the latter are 
commands regarded as necessary irrespective of any particular end. They are 
unconditionally good in themselves and, thus, objectively necessary in their own 
right. In reason of this account, Kant stated his famous formulation of the categorical 
imperative as an expression of the unqualified moral goodness found only in the 
‘good will’. Kant defined the latter as the autonomous human disposition or volition 
to fill the requirements of duty for the sake of duty, that is, out of the rational respect 
for the moral law itself22. In other words, the good will represents, for him, a 
universal disposition that all human beings are capable of exhibiting and acting upon 
in all circumstances. In the end, then, the categorical imperative provides the basis for 
moral principles that are valid for all persons anywhere.  
Kant presented the content of the categorical imperative in three formulations, the 
highest of all moral principles, known as the ‘formula of the universal law’, the 
‘formula of humanity’, and the ‘formula of autonomy’. The first states that it should 
be possible to made of our maxim a universal law23. In other words, the principle 
which we choose to guide our action should possess the form of law and thus being 
universalizable. The second contains the duty to respect humanity, whether in our 
own person or in the person of any other human being, using it always as an end and 
                                                 
22I. Kant, Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals, M. Gregor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1997 p.25  
23Ibid., p.15 
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never merely as a means24. This is the only unconditional or objective end that is 
necessarily shared by all human beings. As consequence, it has an intrinsic rather than 
relative value. Finally, the last formulation suggests that the categorical imperative 
shows the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law25. This 
emphasizes that the universalized maxims or laws on which we act are self-defined 
and self-imposed. This notion can be further expanded to comprise the idea that the 
human beings must form the basis for a political order in which they are subjects to 
law they themselves make26. 
This three-parted notion of the categorical imperative leads Kant to develop the 
conception of an ideal moral community called the “kingdom of ends”. As the author 
defined it, this is “a systematic union of various rational beings through common 
laws”. An individual is a member of the kingdom of ends “when he gives universal 
law in it but it is also himself subject to these laws”27. Although the kingdom of ends 
will always remain an ideal condition that could not be concretely achieved, however, 
it provides a conceptual model for the notion of political community. The reason for 
things to be so is that, as clarified above, morality is about the exercise of the good 
will, doing the right thing for the right reason. Because of this latter point, the political 
realm cannot make us behave morally. Morality is in fact a matter of choice and if 
people do the right thing simply because it is a command of law rather than because it 
is the right thing to do, they are not behaving morally. In this sense, a true kingdom of 
ends is unattainable in the real political world. Yet, a properly constituted political and 
legal order can make it possible for us to behave morally. Moreover, obliging us to 
obey just laws, it can produce a world in which human beings behave as they would 
behave if they were, indeed, governed by the moral law. In the end, then, a well-
settled political and legal arrangement provides the context for a life lived in 
accordance with morality. At this point, to understand what was, for Kant, the 
appropriate form of a rightly established political community we have to analyze his 
account of the nature of civil society which he conceptualized, following the social 
contract tradition, in the Metaphysics of Morals. Here Kant held that every men has an 
“innate or natural right to freedom” by virtue of his humanity28. This natural right to 
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freedom implies the natural right to equality. Kant expressed this notion in terms of 
the “universal principle of right” which claims the freedom of each to be consistent 
with everyone else’s freedom29. Contrary to Hobbes, he did not represent the state of 
nature as a condition of war in itself. It was, however, a situation in which the rights 
of the individual were not secured. Hence, for a matter of justice, it was necessary to 
form a society in which exists a coercive public law. It is thus through the system of 
law and its coercive force that individual rights, including decisively freedom and 
equality, are effectively recognized and possessed. In the end, a properly constituted 
political community is, then, composed of free and equal human beings, each 
regarded as a legislative citizen who freely participate in making the laws which are 
directed towards the full realization of the dignity of every other member. In order for 
this to be so, the only restrictions on individual’s will or actions that are permissible in 
a political setting are those required to allow the freedom of each individual to be 
consistent with the freedom of everyone else. In other words, freedom must be limited 
only according to the recognition of the intrinsic value of humanity. This is in fact the 
only condition that makes freedom general and thus in accordance with the principle 
of reciprocity and equal treatment. Furthermore, as disclosed before, in Kant’s view a 
civil organization is an association of individuals united under a system of public laws 
and thus under the “rightful conditions” of justice. In this respect, he said, each just 
state contains three authorities that constituted “its general united will” or the basis for 
its government. These branches are the legislative, the executive, and the judicial  
which must be organized according to the principle of the separation of powers30. In 
light of this depiction, it can be asserted, then, that Kant ultimately presented the core 
political principles of the modern model of limited constitutional government based 
on the rule of law. This is intended in a essentially negative way, in the sense that the 
state has to provided only the conditions for the realization of individual rights or, as 
above differently argued, the framework within which morality is possible. Kant 
pushed the argument further in that he made this ideal political model correspond with 
the republican form of government which is thereby assumed as the most legitimate 
embodiment of the constitutional state. This is because the republican constitution 
assumes the freedom of individual citizens as the basis for the exercise of the state 
power and endorses a view of the rule of law as generally binding. At the same time, 
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the key functional element of the republic is a representative system of government 
within which all individual citizens, through their delegates, have the opportunity to 
exercise their right to freedom by participating in the creation and enforcement of the 
laws of their state31. 
Much of this republican ideal represented a quite standard feature of the 
Enlightenment political project in general. What was more unusual and of wider 
significance for the particular sake of this thesis is Kant’s insistence that the rule of 
law should have been extended to the relations of states if it was to be effective 
domestically. In this sense, he regarded war as the consequence of the lack of the rule 
of law internationally. Furthermore, he added, war at the international level 
undermines a properly constituted political order both directly, by the human misery it 
causes, and indirectly, because it promotes despotic rule. As consequence, Hobbes 
was wrong to think that an international ‘state of nature’ could be mitigated by 
effective domestic government alone. On the contrary, international relations should 
be brought within the framework of law. This idea occupies a central role in one of 
Kant’s most debated political works, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophic Sketch. Here, 
the Prussian philosopher set out his principles of international law and his idea of a 
suitable and peaceful international order. The first part of Perpetual Peace concerns 
with the appropriate legal principles for a non-ideal world in which war is still a 
feature of international relations. These “Provisional Articles” were designed to push 
the relations between states in a peaceful direction by interdicting those practices in 
war which create continuing enmity between people and outlawing those provisions in 
peace treaties that provided the reasons for the next war. It is noteworthy that these 
are very much the same principles upon which the UN is founded and our 
contemporary legal order is based. The second part of Perpetual Peace, instead, 
contains the “Three Definitive Articles” of Kant’s proposal. The first definite article 
states that the civil constitution of every state ought to be republican, in the sense 
noted above. The second definite article says that the international order should be 
based on a federation of free states. Finally, the third definitive article requires the 
creation of a cosmopolitan law aimed at guaranteeing the right of “hospitality”, a 
“universal right of humanity”, to all individuals32. These definitive articles are Kant’s 
principles of international right or justice. Each of them encompass one of the three 
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overlapping components of the juridical framework of public law taken as a whole. 
The first of them, the ius civitatis, that is, the municipal or civil law, regulates the 
relationship between individuals and their own state. In particular, it concerns the 
construction of a domestic order consistent with the freedom and equality of their 
citizens, as above described. The second, the ius gentium, that is, international law or 
the law of nations, presides over the external relations between independent and equal 
states. As we have seen, this should culminate in the formation of a treaty-based 
federation. At the same time, it is also supportive of the creation of appropriate 
international organizations. All this is conceived by Kant in order to strengthen the 
cohesion between just states which voluntarily agree upon binding law and 
institutions of governance. Finally, the third, the ius cosmopoliticum, that is, the 
cosmopolitan law, is deputed to the relationships of states, of states and individuals, 
and of individuals to each others. It follows from their common membership in the 
universal state of mankind33. In this way, all the three relationships which needed to 
be covered are actually covered thereby. Kant’s view for the establishment of 
perpetual peace is thus a complete project.  
At this point, some remarks on this account are due. First of all, a republican 
constitution is required because, as explained above, only this constitution is 
compatible with the conditions demanded by the moral law. But, Kant also argued 
that republicanism is conducive to peace, because when the executive is submitted to 
the popular will, the general interests are allowed to prevail. Crucially, he suggested, 
in fact, that people do not desire war since they pay most of its consequences. Thus, a 
republican asset can lead to peace since it consents to this will to be freely expressed 
and enforced. On this ground, it has been inferred that a republican regime ought not 
have too much difficulty in forming a federation based on the rejection of war with 
other republics. The basic idea of a general peaceful attitude of people which stands 
behind such argument has been highly criticized. However, it has been an important 
pillar of successive sophisticated approaches, as it was for example for liberal 
internationalism in the twentieth-century. At the same time, it still keeps a central role 
in the elaboration of contemporary hypotheses. For instance, Michael Doyle and 
others, relying upon Kant’s suggestion, have conceptualized the so-called 
‘Democratic Peace’ thesis which asserts that constitutionally secure liberal 
democracies do not go to war with each other. Yet, similar assertions do not solve 
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fundamental questions about the relationship that have to be kept between republican 
and non-republican regimes, thus leaving open, when not enhancing, the possibility of 
the outbreak of war at the international level. This kind of suggestions and the 
problems they arise will be further analyzed in the second part of this thesis.      
A second interesting remark refers to Kant’s conception of a federation of free states. 
In particular, this is not to be confused with advocacy of a world state or world 
government. Kant rejected this step for a variety of reasons. In different passages of 
his work on perpetual peace, he sustained in fact that a world republic would be 
unmanageable because laws loose their force at a distance. At the same time, it would 
be unattainable since it is not currently the ‘will of nations’. Finally, it would be not 
only unnecessary but, even dangerous if brought effectively in place, because the 
concentration of power is always a reason of worry34. In any event, whatever Kant’s 
reasons for refuting a world government, the distinction of the latter from the federal 
organization is an important comment since cosmopolitanism is often mistakenly 
assumed to be proponent of a world state. On the contrary, as it will be shown in the 
second part of this thesis, cosmopolitanism is not inherently opposed to the state in 
itself. Rather it is generally concerned to develop varied modes of governance – from 
the local to the global – with the goal of supporting the rights and interests of 
individuals as human beings. Indeed, states may represent one way of governance 
well-suited to this end. In this respect, Kant’s solution, although explicitly 
cosmopolitan in thought, is essentially statist since the rule of law internationally is to 
be achieved in a world of states. Besides this, Kant’s notion of republic has moved the 
constitutional government far beyond a merely instrumental role. In a significant way, 
in fact, he suggested that such governments are morally necessary for the realization 
of individual rights and the formalization of systems of justice. 
Finally, a last remark concerns the cosmopolitan article. It got substance in regarding 
all individuals as holders of the right to be treated not with hostility when finding 
themselves in a foreign country. It resulted in the corresponding duty which obliged 
both states and native persons to grant hospitality to the strangers. The world 
inhabitants own this right without distinction, in virtue of their possess of equal moral 
status. It is in effect both a natural and legal right that guaranteed freedom of 
movement, social intercourse, and commerce between different people. This was so 
on the moral basis of the more fundamental unity of all human beings conceived as a 
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single community spread across the commonly shared surface of the globe. “In this 
way”, Kant wrote, “continents distant from each other can enter into peaceful mutual 
relations which eventually be regulated by public laws, thus bringing the human race 
nearer to a cosmopolitan constitution”35. The cosmopolitan design is thus further 
extended to encompass a body of law, universally binding, that codifies the rights and 
obligations of all persons and states. In this way Kant’s conception of cosmopolitan 
law embodies the universalism of his moral theory while seeking formal codification 
of individuals’ fundamental rights irrespective of their nationality, ethnicity, social 
status, or religious beliefs.     
            
b) Nationalism 
 
Although cosmopolitanism was the prevailing theme of Enlightenment, in any 
case there was also an anti-cosmopolitan thought that became stronger until coming to 
be dominant in the nineteenth century. Partially, this was the result of the republican 
strain of thought proper of the Enlightenment period which was associated with the 
notion of popular government. But, in the nineteenth century, the love of country 
endorsed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau became associated with the romantic critique of 
the Enlightenment to turn into the doctrine of nationalism. This position stressed the 
importance of belonging to a community. In this respect, a key figure was the 
folklorist Jonathan Gottfried Herder. In his view, language defined a people and 
shaped its thought and hence its way of life. As consequence, any kind of universal 
cosmopolitan culture could only mean the dominance of one culture over the others. 
This approach combined with the patriotic republicanism of the French Revolution 
and the resistance to this republicanism once it turned into imperialism, finally flew 
into the doctrine of ‘nationalism’ – the belief that the world is composed of discrete 
peoples who in the form of nations are entitled to rule themselves. Nationalism was 
not immediately contrary to cosmopolitan thought. Mazzini, for example, explicitly 
considered love of country as perfectly compatible with love for humanity. But, 
history has largely demonstrated that nationalism is more often an enormous divisible 
force. The importance of nationalism is that it provided a justification of sovereign 
states not simply based on dynastic legitimacy and the property right of kings and 
princes.  
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Yet, in this period not all the defenses of particularistic politics were immediately 
linked to nationalism. In this sense, Hegel, in his account of the rational, ethical state, 
shared the romantic critique of cosmopolitanism and the idea that human beings need 
to be part of a community without falling strictly into nationalism. To be true, the 
Hegelian ethical state might also be a national state but this is not a necessary 
connection and Hegel rejected any account which implies that there are fundamental 
differences between human beings. Thus, although cosmopolitanism must not be set 
in opposition to the concrete life of the state, human beings are in a fundamental way 
equal. At the same time, Hegel recognized an element of affection required from part 
of the citizen, but directed to the concrete institutions of the ethical state and not to the 
myth of the Nation. In this way, he provided a justification for the division of the 
world into separate polities that did not rest on the illusory concept of the Nation. 
Moreover, the Hegelian account of the state-system can be employed to give ethical 
content to the notion of international society. In this respect, Hegel understood history 
as the growing self-understanding of Geist (spirit) which is possible through the 
emergence of ever more complex and ethically adherent institutions, culminating in 
the rational, ethical state of the modern age. Contrary to conventional liberal thought, 
for Hegel, the state was not the site of policy decision-making. Its role was rather to 
reconcile individuals with each other in a context, like Kant’s, which is crucially 
characterized by the rule of law and the separation of powers. With respect to the 
main concerns of this thesis, the final sections of the Elements of the Philosophy of 
Right are particularly relevant here36. In those sections, Hegel set up in fact his 
account of an international scenario made up by such ethical states. He believed that 
the states need other states in order to function properly. Just as individuals cannot 
develop their individuality except by coming into relation with other individuals so 
states can only develop their individuality by living in a world of other states. 
However, beyond this analogy, the crucial point is that for Hegel states cannot 
surrender their sovereignty and war must always remain a possibility. As 
consequence, any project of ‘Perpetual Peace’, like Kant’s, is destined for failing. 
Such project rely in fact on states agreeing to limit themselves and any such 
agreement is subject to contingency and thus liable to collapse when and if 
circumstances change.                                                                                 
                                                 
36F. Hegel, ‘Elements of the Philosophy of Rights’, in Allen w. Wood (ed.), Cambridge Texts in the 
History of Political Thought, translated by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991 
 26
c) Industrial Revolution and International Relations 
 
At the early nineteenth century, we might say that the central features of the 
Westphalia System and all the major critiques and defenses of a system of sovereign 
states were already been developed. In any case, the Industrial Revolution and the rise 
of industrialism determined a new look at notions such as that of sovereignty. Before 
the rise of industrial society, international trade was a relatively unimportant aspect of 
a state’s life. The doctrine dominated by the mercantilist thought, regarded trade a 
political as much as an economic activity. Mutual benefits through trade were 
unattainable and the aim of politics in trading relations with foreigners was then to 
avoid losses and achieve gains. It was in reason of this view that a shared belief was 
widespread that trade, and more in general contact with foreigners, promoted conflict. 
The founders of liberal political economy, especially Adam Smith and David Ricardo, 
removed the intellectual foundations of this point of view, so that the intellectual case 
in favor of general gains from trade became very strong. This became the basis for a 
new look at inter-state relations. In this sense, Richard Cobden, the most important 
English advocate of free trade, believed that the states system which was applied to 
international affairs of Europe in the preceding century was no more suitable to the 
circumstances of his time. His particular contribution was the firm belief that the old 
form of international interaction based on the balance of power was made outmoded. 
He was also highly critical of the idea that the protection of trade could be a legitimate 
reason for state action. In line with later liberal internationalists, trade rested, in his 
view, on the cheapness of commodities which is compromised by high military 
spending. War as such is thus a disaster for a nation and the most important way in 
which it can exercise influence is rather by being a moral example for the rest of the 
world. Yet, unlike some later campaigners, Cobden was not supportive of a world 
government or even a pacific union of republican states. On his account the forces of 
modernity would create a peaceful world if left to their own devices37. As 
consequence, there was no necessity for institutional innovation and non-intervention 
was all that was required for peace because it was the only provision necessary to 
allow the beneficial effects of trade to be felt.  
However, this approach was not shared by neo-mercantilist critics. In this sense, one 
of the main representatives of this theoretical branch, Friederich List, regarded free 
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trade as an appropriate strategy for the dominant economic power, but highly 
disadvantageous for everyone else. Moreover, he encouraged the creation of a 
customs union for the German states38. In this respect, his account represented an 
interesting development in particular for the notion that there is a specific optimal size 
for sovereign states as economic units. This suggestion was based on the principle that 
successful industry requires a larger domestic market than that which could be 
provided by individual states.       
Despite the divergence on concrete trade policies, protectionists and liberals shared, 
however, a generally favorable approach to industrial capitalism. Less favorably 
disposed were the socialist critics of the new economic order. But, it was only in later 
nineteenth century that, thanks to the shift from an economic system mainly based on 
small-scale manufacturing concerns to large-scale industry, the possibility was made 
for the state to be seen as representing the interests of national capital. This 
development further allowed these critics to state a distinctive account of international 
relations. This is not to say that mid-nineteenth-century socialists, including Marx and 
Hegel, did not have a great concern with international relations, but simply that, in a 
epoch where the owner was also the manager and the possibility for such enterprises 
to capture the state was remote, the link between state and national capital was not 
immediately caught. The guidelines of the new distinctive socialist approach are well 
illustrated by the work of the Austrian Marxist, Rudolf Hilferding. On his view, the 
national economies of the advanced capitalist powers were dominated by oligopolies 
in such a way that capitalists no longer competed with each other within the national 
economy, but instead they competed with foreign capitals which also formed national 
blocks. At the same time, they sought to extend the area of their monopoly profits and 
this led to imperialism in the sense of a general tendency to expand. In this scenario, 
the state represented the instrument through which these oligopolies could get both 
their defensive and aggressive goals. In this sense, on Hilferding’s account, tariff 
policy was not seen simply as a defensive strategy aimed at restricting the 
international competition between national oligopolies, but also as a tool that could be 
employed aggressively to expand the national territory39. In other words, Hilferding 
regarded imperialism as the foreign policy of financial capital and, along with other 
Marxist writers of the time such as Rosa Luxemburg, was concerned by the increasing 
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militarism of international relations which finally brought to the outbreak of the First 
World War. Although the intent of Hilferding’s reasoning was far from being 
supportive of nationalist thought, he shared the notion of the state as the expression of 
national economy. In fact, Hilferding’s depiction could be easily used to set up a plan 
of economic nationalism and he also provided a good reason for taking the state as the 
key actor in international relations.  
Yet, this account of international relations as a scenario of struggles between 
competing national oligopolies, contrasted strikingly with the liberal position. In this 
respect, Norman Angell argued, in The Great Illusion, that a condition of international 
interdependence was actually on place already in the early twentieth century.40 As 
consequence, it no longer made sense to think that states could improve their position 
by violent conflict with one another. There is a debate here that will reappear in 
twentieth century international thought and still has not been resolved in the early 
twenty-first century, although now it is globalization that is said to generate the 
illusion that nation-based economic policies can be profitable.  
 
 
1.3. Twentieth-century International Political Theory 
 
The late twentieth-century debates took place within a different context from 
that earlier described. In this sense, the most striking feature of international thought 
in the twentieth century was not so much any innovation in content but rather the 
emergence of International Relations as a discrete field of academic study. This 
change was largely conceived in response to the horrors of war, especially to the 
shock of the 1914-18 war. In this respect, it could be well-argued that the Great War 
actually followed the conceptions of international relations which had dominated this 
subject for the previous centuries. The war was indeed fought by states exercising 
their sovereign right to resort to violence in accordance with old established principles 
of international law. It was won by a coalition of states united only by their 
determination to prevent one state from achieving military dominance over the 
continent, a motivation which could be understood at any time in the previous three 
centuries. Finally, it was a war generated by the conflict propensity associated with 
nationalism, as it was the case for almost of all major wars of the preceding century. 
                                                 
40N. Angell, The Great Illusion, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1909  
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What was changed by the First World War was the liberal view that modern industrial 
society was safe from such violent and irrational behaviors thanks to the peace-
generating qualities of international economic relations. This statement made then 
necessary the creation of the discipline of International Relations to fill the gap 
between the real nature of international relations and their erroneous understanding.  
Yet, this need of a distinctive discipline of International Relation was not so widely 
shared. On the contrary, it was largely confined to liberal circles in Britain and 
America. At the first time, America took the leadership of this new approach thanks 
mainly to the figure of the US President Woodrow Wilson who was really committed 
to the new ideas. But, the failure of the US to ratify the Versailles Treaty and the 
Covenant of the League of Nations meant that this leadership passed to the British 
liberal establishment. The significance of the fact that the new discourse was shaped 
by Anglo-American liberal thinking is considerable. These thinkers had in fact a 
different view of the nature of the state if compared with continental liberalism and 
this had a deep impact on the discipline. In particular, they understood the state as an 
institution designed to solve the problem of collective action rather than an institution 
which was central to the constitution of the collectivity itself and to individual 
personality. In other words, liberal internationalists rejected the Hegelian notion, 
shared by many continental liberals, that the state is an institution which brings 
meaning into the lives of individuals, giving them a sense of their worth as equal 
citizens. Instead, in open contrast with Hegel’s depiction, these English-speaking 
theorists assumed that the state was an entity which existed in civil society rather than 
beyond. In this sense, it is significant that such liberals did not use the term ‘the state’, 
preferring a more administrative term as ‘the government’. This orientation towards 
the state continues to have considerable importance for the discipline of International 
Relations and the liberal presuppositions that underlie this field can be found in both 
liberal internationalism and realism, the two main strains which dominated the 
twenty-century international thought.  
 
a) Liberal Internationalism 
 
Liberal internationalism consists of the application of liberal principles to 
international affairs. In the aftermath of the First World War this effort focused on 
two tasks, determining what had produced the 1914 war and conceiving mechanisms 
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and principles that would have prevented its occurrence. The first element of this 
twofold project concerned domestic politics. A firm liberal belief, shared as we have 
seen above by Kant among others, was that people do not want war. People are led 
into war by autocrats or, as John Stuart Mill noted, because their legitimate aspirations 
to nationhood are blocked by undemocratic, multinational, imperial system. As 
consequence, an obvious answer to this situation was to promote democratic political 
systems and the general acceptance of the principle of self-determination. In other 
words, liberal internationalists stated that if all regimes were national and liberal-
democratic there would be no war. The second component of liberal internationalism 
was its critique of pre-1914 international structure. In this respect, the basic thesis was 
that the anarchy of pre-1914 system of international relations undermined the 
prospects for peace. In particular, most of the blame expressed by liberal 
internationalists was directed to secret diplomacy because this led to a system of 
alliances that committed nations to courses of action that were not sanctioned by 
parliaments. Moreover, they argued, there was no mechanism in 1914 to prevent war 
except for the balance of power, a notion which liberals associated with unprincipled 
power-politics. In contrast to this state of affairs, liberal internationalism suggested 
the establishment of new principles of international relations, such as open covenants 
openly discussed. But, above all, they called for a new institutional arrangement of 
international relations and, in particular, for the creation of a League of Nations. In 
their view, the League would have provided public assurances of security founded on 
the collective will of all nations. Hence the term ‘collective security’. In other words, 
every country would have guaranteed the security of every other country and thus 
there would have been no need of military alliances or the balance of power. In the 
end, law would have so replaced war as the underlying principle of the system.  
These projects of reform were liberal in two main senses. In political terms, they were 
liberal since they enforced the belief that constitutional government and the rule of 
law were principles of universal applicability. In philosophical sense, they were 
liberal as far as they were grounded on the assumption of an underlying harmony of 
people’s real interests. Liberal internationalists were obviously aware that in some 
circumstances interests can effectively clash but in their analysis this was the product 
of pressures of particular interests or due to simple ignorance. However, such kind of 
events were designed to disappear when the real interests of people were made 
manifest.  
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From an economic standpoint, it is interesting to notice that liberal internationalists 
rejected the view that war in 1914 was caused by economic rivalries. For this reason 
the makers of the new world order in 1919, unlike their successors in 1945, did not 
felt necessary to set up regulatory international economic institutions, largely because 
they believed that economic relationship would look after themselves. In this respect, 
their main aim was then to get back rather than transform the pre-war situation.  
Liberal internationalism ideas remained powerful all over the twentieth century and 
still have wide resonance into the twenty-first. In this sense, even though some of the 
settled norms of the current international order can be tracked back to the Westphalia 
System, the 1919 ideas can be seen to have considerably shifted the meaning of these 
norms. Thus, for example, although the principle of state sovereignty is certainly still 
a settled norm of the contemporary international order, after 1919, this notion is no 
longer associated with the right of the state to make war at will as instead it was for 
much of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the current and strongly debated 
‘Democratic Peace’ thesis, again suggests links with the principles of 1919. Also this 
thesis, focusing on questions of whether and how the principles of democracy and the 
rule of law are or should be settled norms within the current international order, can 
be said to deal with the same puzzles faced by liberal internationalists. Yet, what is 
striking, and main object of critique from Cosmopolitan Democracy, is how much of 
the older Westphalia System this liberal doctrine and its influence have endorsed in 
the current international order. At the heart of this objection is the liberal acceptance 
of the sovereign state as the central actor in international relations. In fact, although 
many liberal internationalists have wanted to orient the behavior of states in a 
particular peaceful direction, they have not attempted to overcome the central role of 
the state as such.          
   
b) Realism 
 
The rise of the dictators in the 1930s, and, then, the outbreak of the Second 
World War, seemed simultaneously to undermine the explanatory capacity of 1919 
ideas and to make irrelevant their normative power. In this sense, the liberal 
assumption that the people are naturally peaceful was undermined by the conquest of 
the power of Hitler in Germany and Mussolini in Italy. These regimes in fact not only 
had come to power by quasi-democratic means. More significantly, they remained in 
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power thanks to the mobilization of popular support that was granted to them although 
they actually glorified war. The fact that Nazism and Fascism remained a popular 
force in spite of this posture, evidently represented a terrific objection to liberal 
thinking which was felt in particular with respect to the liberal support for the League 
of Nations and the rule of law. The basic premise of liberal internationalism was in 
fact that the force of world opinion would have supported the work of the League of 
Nation and that no state would have been able to act against this force. In reason of 
this, international disputes would have been solved peacefully because this was what 
the people really wanted. The behavior of Hitler and Mussolini showed that these 
ideas were simply wrong. As consequence of this evidence, in the 1930s, a critique of 
liberal internationalism emerged. In this respect, a key figure was Reinhold Niebuhr. 
According to his view, comprehensively articulated in his Moral Man and Immoral 
Society, liberals exaggerated the capacity of men to behave in truly moral terms. He 
held that men have the capacity to be good, but that this capacity is always in conflict 
with aggressive drives which are also present in human nature. For Niebuhr, these 
drives get to a full development in society and it was unrealistic to think that they 
could be controlled in bodies such as the League of Nations to the goal of 
international peace41. This position later became the basis for post-1945 American 
realism in the hands of George Kennan and Hans J. Morgenthau. In particular, the 
latter’s text, Politics Among Nations,42 represented the single most important source 
for realist thinking about international relations for the next generation until at least 
the 1970s. Equally important in the UK was the work of Edward Hallett Carr who 
provided a new vocabulary for international relations theory. He renamed liberal 
internationalism as ‘utopianism’ and contrasted this approach with ‘realism’. Carr’s 
central point was that the liberal doctrine of the harmony of people’s interests did not 
take into account the real conflict that was to be found in international relations 
between ‘the haves’ and ‘the have-nots’. In his view, a central feature of the world is 
‘scarcity’ – there are not enough goods and resources for all. As consequence, Carr 
argued, those who have them promote law and regulative polices in order to keep 
them. On the other side, those who have not them, have no such respect for the law, 
nor it should be reasonable that they should, because it is the law that keeps them in 
                                                 
41R. Neibuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1932 
42H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Alfred A. Knopf , New 
York, 1948, trans. it, Politica tra le nazioni. La lotta per il potere e la pace, il Mulino, Bologna, (1948) 
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their lower condition. With respect to this analysis, Carr concluded then that it was 
utopian to suggest that the have-nots could be brought to realize that they ought to 
behave legally and morally. On the contrary, politics had to be based on an 
understanding of this conflictual situation43.  
Realists of this generation explicitly saw themselves as holders of  the wisdom of the 
old European states-system. In this sense, the names of Thucydides, Machiavelli, 
Hobbes, Grotius and Vattel were often recurrent in the work of these authors and the 
sense that they were drawing on a European tradition of statecraft was widely shared. 
Yet, the realists’ use of the European tradition of statecraft was actually highly 
selective. For example, the humanist, republican side of Machiavelli did not fit with 
the realist picture of the world. Indeed, none of the American or British realists of this 
period adopted a theory of the state that was republican, nor they portrayed the state 
as a positive force in people’s lives. The characteristic realist virtue is ‘prudence’ 
which certainly played a part in the European tradition of statecraft. But the notion 
that glory and prestige were also important is largely missing from the realist thinkers. 
In this respect, Morgenthau treated ‘prestige’ essentially as an instrument of foreign 
policy rather than as something to be valued in its own terms. The essential point that 
needs to be made here is that although the differences between realists and liberals, 
nonetheless they were essentially working within the same broad and mainly (Anglo-
American) liberal framework. The realist theory of the state relate in fact back to the 
ideas developed by pro-liberals such as Hobbes and Locke who saw the state as a 
problem-solving mechanism aimed at problems of domestic order.  
This position became even clearer later in the life of realist thought in international 
relations when rational choice models of political behavior come to dominate. With 
the advent of rational choice on the theoretical panorama of international relations, it 
begun also to be challenged the belief that this disciple was a sui generis subject made 
of concepts and theories specific to the field. The selective use of past authorities, 
noted above, was partially a product of this intent to keep international relations in a 
separate category from domestic policy. In this sense, the humanist, republican side of 
Machiavelli was seen as applicable to politics internally, rather than to external 
relations of states. Similarly, the relevance of the work of figures such as Kant and 
Hegel was restricted to internal affairs of states. In any event, from 1970s onward, 
especially the American study on international relations has been dominated by the 
                                                 
43E. H. Carr, The twenty Years Crisis, Macmillan, London, 1939  
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same broad theory employed by American political scientists, namely, Rational 
Choice theory. Its presumption is that politics can be understood in terms of the goal-
directed behavior of individuals who are assumed to act rationally in the minimal 
sense. That is, individuals make ends-means calculations aimed at maximizing the 
benefits or minimize the losses expected from particular situations. This perspective, 
sometimes termed neo-utilitarianism, came to American International Relations 
thanks in particular to the work of Kenneth Waltz and the neo-realist school. Waltz’s 
version of realism focused on the structure of the international system. The central 
idea of Watz’s ‘theory of international politics’ is grounded on the basic distinction 
between ‘hierarchical systems’ and ‘anarchical systems’. The latter are made up of 
like-units which are differentiated in terms of capabilities but not in terms of 
functions. The former are composed of functionally differentiated institutions. The 
members of an anarchical system are assumed to be egoist actors who seek, at 
minimum, to preserve themselves. When they succeed in this task and there is no 
guarantee that they will, their actions will result in the creation of balances of 
power44. In this way Waltz draws a sharp distinction between international and 
domestic politics, following classical realism in this. But he does so by the use of a 
reasoning which is common to both spheres. Moreover, the same kind of reasoning 
can be employed to produce a rather different result. Thus, it is possible to argue that 
egoists can actually cooperate under conditions of anarchy. From out of this 
consideration has emerged the neo-liberal alternative to neo-realism. The contest 
between these two strains of thought have occupied the US international relations 
debate for the last twenty years. For the purposes of this discussion two features of 
this rational choice dominance are particularly noteworthy. First, as Joseph Grieco has 
suggested, there is a clear difference between neo-liberals who assume that states seek 
absolute-gains and neo-realists who assume they seek relative-gains, but this 
difference, although real, is relatively unimportant in a wider perspective45.. In this 
sense, although neo-realism is usually seen as in opposition to neo-liberalism, both 
views are in a deep sense liberal. As matter of fact, they not only replay a classical 
debate between Hobbesian and Lockean forms of reasoning, but at the same time, 
more fundamentally they work both on the shared assumptions that states are egoist 
                                                 
44K. Walt, ‘Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory’, in Journal of International Affairs, vol. 44, 1990, 
pp. 21-37 
45J. M. Grieco, ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
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and exist in order to solve problems of collective action. The second important feature 
of the dominance of rational choice thinking is the way in which a number of 
fundamental questions about international relations have been marginalized. Since the 
origins of Westphalia System, a key question for international thought has concerned 
the nature of the obligations that individual human beings have towards their fellow 
citizens as opposed to those they have towards the rest of humanity. This question of 
inclusion and exclusion remained central to international discourses across the 
centuries and is still at the hearth of contemporary international relations. In 
particular, it currently receives specification in discourses such as those of 
international human rights regime, borders and refugees and global economic 
equality. But, it is a question which is very difficult to ask from the perspectives of 
neo-realist and neo-liberal thought, because the first premise of both these approaches 
is that states are rational egoists. As consequence, this main question of inclusion and 
exclusion as well as the puzzles related to it are relegated to a separate, marginalized 
                                                
and inferior discourse.      
Predictably, the dominance of neo-realism and neo-liberalism has produced counter-
movements but in spite of the rise of a great body of unorthodox thought the strength 
of rational choice apparatus has not to be underestimated. The fate of 
‘constructivism’, the most popular of these counter-views, is indicative in this sense. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, constructivism was a radical doctrine that 
challenged in a fundamental way the rational choice approach. Relying on 
Wittgenstein’s notion of a language game, authors such as Anthony Giddens, with his 
concept of ‘structuration’, Berger and Luckmann, with their social-psychological 
constructivist analysis, together with early constructivists as Friedrich Kratochwil and 
Nicholas Onuf produced accounts of the world which were in open contrast with the 
studies of Waltz and the others scholars of rational choice46. Yet, as Kubalkova 
pointed out, constructivism has currently become a part of the mainstream which it 
originally criticized. In this respect, the most important recent book in the area, 
Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics47, is strongly accused to 
pay a high tribute to Waltz’s 1979 text, Theory of International Relations, at the point 
that its content is often regarded more as a particular area of rational choice thinking 
rather than as a real challenge to its doctrine. In short, the rest of this thesis will be 
 
46A. Giddens, The Third Way and its Critics, Cambridge Polity Press, Cambridge, 2000; N. Onuf, 
World of Our Making, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, SC, 1989  
47A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999 
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devoted both to investigate the approach of Cosmopolitan Democracy, which is 
certainly part of this wider unorthodox field of thought, and to sustain its validity. 
But, the support that will be given to this work has not to be mistaken for the 
prediction that the rational choice approach is going to lose its dominance on the field 
in the short run. On the contrary, Cosmopolitan Democracy and, more in general, 
international political theory are minority discourses which are likely to remain so for 
the near future. However, this does prevent us neither from studying their reasoning, 
nor from defending their significance, nor from working for their future prevalence.          
  
.4. Self-determination and Non-intervention 
 
  
 
1
Looking at the last sections, it could be well argued that there is actually one 
problem, although many theories. This is the problem of finding the right relationship 
between  the universal and the particular in international relations. With respect to the 
current international order, this problem appears in terms of the clash between the 
inherited norms of the Westphalia System and the most recently established norms of 
the so-called system of Global Governance. While the former privileges the 
particularistic values associated with the state, the latter promotes universal values in 
the area of human rights, global environmental politics, global justice, and so on. The 
recognition of this fundamental clash will stand at the background of the remaining 
chapters of this thesis. But, before coming to the study of the manifestations of this 
central problematic of international political theory, here the Westphalia norms of 
self-determination and non-intervention will be examined. Furthermore, some 
puzzling points significant for the proceeding of this discussion will be also analyzed.   
 To begin with self-determination, a clarification seems immediately useful. The 
norms of self-determination and non-intervention are generally considered as the key 
arguments in defense of sovereignty. Thus, their combination is usually seen as 
providing the ground for a Westphalian asset of international relations. But, strictly 
speaking, self-determination is not a Westphalian norm. However, over the last 
hundred years, the two notions have become so closely linked that they are usually 
treated together at the point that some of the most important defenses of one notion 
rely upon the other for their force. The basic idea behind self-determination was set 
out 150 years ago by. John Stuart Mill in his Considerations on Representative 
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Government, where the author stated that “the question of government ought to be 
decided by the governed” The clear simplicity of this claim makes evident that 
although this notion has been often associated with nationalism, it can be accepted 
even by those who are not nationalists. As the same Mill declared, in fact, “any 
division of the human race”48, whatever is the grounding-principle through which this 
division has been settled, should be free to determine its own fate. However, a 
proposition so enounced raises numerous problems and they have recurred with some 
frequency over the last century and half. First, can it really be possible that any 
division of the human race could have the right of self-determination? Second, what 
of the case when one division may wish to associate with another which, however, 
does not wish to associate with it? Third, it seems that, implicitly, self-determination 
involves the right to a particular territory but what if two different divisions of the 
human race claim the same territory? And what of those division of human race which 
are not linked to a particular territory, as the gypsies for example? Mill had a solution 
to these problems because it is clear from else where in his work that he did not 
actually believe that any division of the human race was entitled to self-determination. 
In his view, only progressive, historic nations had this right and the less developed 
required the protection of the betters. This solution has never been widely accepted 
but, looking at the historical developments until the current international legal assets, 
no better solutions seem effectively to have been immediately available. A look at the 
application of the right of self-determination in the contemporary international legal 
and political arrangement is reveling in this sense. In fact, although, in practice, this 
right has been attributed to all colonies, it has been also ensured that self-
determination took place within the boundaries determined by the colonial powers. In 
the same way, the claims of self-determination in the case of the break up of 
composite states, such as the old Soviet Union or the former Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, have been satisfied in reason of the pre-existing boundaries 
of those federal systems. The questions that this reading of the right of self-
determination have generated, and the puzzles that its actual implementation have 
produced, are well known to anyone with a minimal knowledge even only of the most 
recent happenings of world politics. On one side, they relate to the problem of  
coexistence between highly particularistic ‘divisions of the human race’, as tribes, 
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ethnic, cultural or religious groups. Where, such human micro-entities have found 
themselves to live together in a political arrangement unilaterally settled by the extern 
and based on the modern state idea of almost homogenous communities, many 
occasions of conflict have raised. This conflictuality seems to be an appropriate 
characteristic for many post-colonial African states. On the other side, we assist to the 
outbreak of periodical crises in some specific areas of the Euro-Asian zone, as for 
example in the Balkans and in the Caucasus. The problems the common 
understanding of the principle of self-determination presents in those cases are linked 
with the presence of overwhelming majorities within established borders which 
ems that outside of the state ambit, 
enclose communities that do not necessarily want to live together.  
However, Mill’s suggestion that ‘the question of government ought to be decided by 
the governed’ arises another set of problems which concerns the relationship between 
self-determination and democracy. The idea that the will of the people and not the 
property right of the prince determine the legitimacy of a government is precisely 
what makes the norm of self-determination not properly a provision of the Westphalia 
System. But, in this respect, two main questions are opened. How do the people 
decide the question of government? And, can we really assume that once self-
determination is granted, free and democratic institutions would be the only choice the 
people will make? As regard to the first problem, it is clear that popular choice 
presumes the existence of a defined electorate. But, especially on transnational 
questions and on those matters which concern narrower communities, it is frequently 
properly this definition to be at dispute. In these cases, the definition of the 
appropriate political community has became even more fundamental. Who should 
decide on the track of the new European railway Lisbon-Moscow? The people who 
lives in the territory that the railway should cross, the states embraced by the project, 
the EU, or an Euro-Russian Committee constituted ad hoc? At a domestic level the 
democratic political arrangements have found a solution to these problems. Through 
the work of legislative assemblies and constitutional organs, these ordainments 
determine the relative decisional weight of the different actors involved and solve the 
various conflict of competences. But, at an extra-bounders level there are no global 
institutions comparable to these. As result, since democracy can only come into play 
once this kind of questions have been solved, it se
there is no democratic answer to these problems.  
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The second puzzling aspect of the relationship between self-determination and 
democracy, refers to the reasonable possibility that the people, if given the power of 
choice, would not choose free institutions. In this prospect, it can be inferred that a 
democratic arrangement has not more legitimacy than any other regime. At the same 
time, it suggests that the relationship between self-determination and free institutions 
is not given as such, but it is rather linked to contingent factors of specific 
circumstances. In reason of that, it has been argued that democracy can be only 
imported but not exported. In other words, a process of democratization would be 
impossible without the support of internal pressures. This also means that each people 
walks on its personal political path, being linked both to the particular conditions of 
s intervention would be welcomed and instead would not be 
occurrence, development and consolidation of these pressures within it and their 
expression into a specific political project.   
However, this does not reduce the importance of the influence of the international 
sphere which remains a decisive factor, although not according a singular general 
rule. The idea of exporting democracy is long-standing and was a common feature of 
Athenian democrats, French revolutionaries and Russian Bolsheviks. Sustained even 
by sophisticated theoretical apparatuses, as that of the so-called ‘Democratic Peace’ 
theory, this purpose has been also a distinctive trait of the American foreign policy in 
many occasions. Recently, it has been effectively implemented by the former US 
President George W. Bush’s approach to international relations. This question arises 
strong worries and wide theoretical problems often concentrated on the threat of the 
dominance of the stronger on the weaker. In this respect, the norm of self-
determination seems, however, to require that who intends to export democracy 
should assure that hi
considered by the people involved as a mere shift from an authoritative regime to an 
external imposition.  
The idea of exporting democracy is one of the aspects of international relations debate 
which more evidently shows the strong connection existing between the right of self-
determination and the other, more fundamental stronghold of the Westphalia System: 
the norm of non-intervention. In this respect, since the beginning of the Westphalia 
System the assumption has been that sovereignty implies non-intervention. This is to 
say that external bodies, including states, have no right to intervene in the affairs of a 
sovereign state. As we have seen, sovereignty involves internal supremacy and 
external equal legal status, and the latter is summarized by the notion of non-
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intervention. This legal status is confirmed by the UN Charter according to Article 
2(4), which forbids the use of force by the states unless in self-defense or with the 
authority of the Security Council, and Article 2(7) which declares that the domestic 
jurisdiction of states has to be respected. But, as both the historical experience shows 
and the same idea of exporting democracy confirms, the norm of non-intervention 
have been repeatedly challenged when not effectively violated over the last 350 years. 
here are in fact 
in a radically different manner to both the problems here 
 and the main question of inclusion and exclusion debated across all the previous 
aragraphs.                       
     
This tendency is so evident that Stephen Krasner coined the term ‘organized 
hypocrisy’ to describe the actual, very ultimate meaning of norm.  
The most important difficulty in this respect is distinguishing between intervention 
which is illegitimate, and influence which, on the contrary, has to be considered 
legitimate. Clearly, states attempt to influence each other all the time and would be 
absurd to suggest that this most basic political and diplomatic activity is improper. 
The problem is that the means which states employ to influence each other are not 
confined to persuasion or reasoned arguments. As matter of fact, the exercise of 
influence almost in all circumstances implies the exercise of political power, and 
frequently can flow into violent actions directed toward the civil society of another 
state. There are no obvious way to set a clear boundary between intervention and 
influence. One possible solution is to draw a distinction in absolute terms. In this way, 
intervention would take place only when the power of decision is taken away from the 
state intervened against, that is to say, when military force is used and actual control 
established. This is a clear separation, but it may be too restrictive. T
many cases where superior power is exercised without actual control in which the 
exercise of influence seems to have crossed the border of legitimacy.  
This section has established that neither self-determination nor non-intervention are 
simple notions. Both are difficult to define in operational terms and both generate 
deep problems. The next chapter will be devoted to describe the idea of Cosmopolitan 
Democracy, an alternative approach to the Westphalian conception of international 
relations. This view answers 
faced
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2. From the world of states to the citizens of the world 
evolution of Western political arrangement in general, 
the right to select who is entitled to govern. The 
ake such decisions and have granted the means to 
according to non-violent 
  
 
 
2.1. Inclusion and  world arrangement: steps forward and failures  
 
The analysis of the historical 
shows an interesting trend, namely, the enhance of the recognized actors and the 
mechanisms of participation.  
At the domestic level, the success, although not complete, has been certainly large. 
From the epoch of the sovereigns, who reigned in virtue of God’s will or for dynastic 
reasons, we shifted to a system which has progressively involved an increasing 
number of individuals in the choice of the legitimate government. At the beginning, 
few persons were designed to this task according to the amount of their wealth. But, 
thanks to the work of some enlightened thinkers and at the cost of hard struggles 
fought by the peoples, finally, we got a system which deals with us no more as mere 
subjects, but as citizen and grants us 
right to vote was guaranteed first to all the adult males, then, it has been extended to 
all citizens without discriminations.  
The basic idea of this system is grounded on a simple consideration. The decisions 
taken by the government affect the life of every singular member of the political 
community. As consequence, each citizen, as an interested-subject, ought to have the 
right to vote for those who will t
affect their action. In reason of this, it has been stated that the government must be 
submitted to the popular control.  
In parallel with this conception, the rule of law has been constitutionally enacted 
together with a set of shared norms aimed at regulating the interaction between the 
state’s institutions, the relationships of these with the citizens, and those of each of the 
latter with the others. The preeminence assigned to the rule of law endorsed the 
resolution of the conflicts between these internal actors, 
means. At the same time, it provided all citizens with an equal set of rights, in 
particular, as seen, concerning their political participation.   
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These founding principles of what we currently call democracy were initially 
employed only in the Western countries. Yet, they spread quantitatively in a way that 
currently makes the democratic system of government the most adopted political 
regime among the world states. At the same time, this asset developed qualitatively 
into more and more sophisticated systems. Nowadays, for example, in some European 
tical issues to internal questions promoting the view of a single world 
e 
democratic states is under discussion the further extension of the political 
participation to foreigners who have resided for a stable period within those countries 
and have regularly paid taxes.  
If this has been the history of the political asset internally to the states, for what 
concerns the arrangement they gave to their relations, things have run differently. 
Certainly, from the all-embracing conceptions of the empire and the church, some 
results have been gained even on this stage. The idea of the empire attempted to 
reduce all poli
arrangement. Thus, through a process of self-recognition, it acknowledged itself both 
as the only legitimated universal political actor and the exclusive source of this 
legitimation.  
As we have seen, the Peace of Westphalia definitively challenged this principle, 
placing the equal international status of autonomous polities beside their internal 
supremacy as main pillar of their absolute sovereignty. On this ground, the idea of a 
society of states was conceptualized together with the international law aimed at its 
governing. Yet, in this asset, the duty to respect international obligations, in particular, 
for what concern war and the use of violence, remained strongly limited by the stat
right of self-defense which they held in all circumstances. This right, so widely 
conceived, allowed states to make war almost whenever they thought it appropriate to 
preserve their security and the general balance of power, even through pre-emption.  
The cosmopolitan thought of the Enlightenment looked for a solution to what its 
exponents believed to be a narrow-minded view of politics of international relations. 
Crucially, we have noted, for Kant, the question of finding a way for restraining inter-
state war and putting on place a system of international relations respectful of its 
obligations was a central condition for both the just internal development of states and 
the complete progress of human beings. At this aim, he elaborated his three-parted 
project for perpetual peace which was directed to both the domestic 
institutionalization of republican regimes and the extension of the rule of law at the 
transnational level. Despite Kant’s proposal for the world asset was essentially state-
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based, as expressed in his idea of a federation of republics voluntarily binding 
themselves up to a shared international law. At the same time, his fundamental 
cosmopolitan formulation guaranteed the recognition of all individuals as the ultimate 
cert’ of the European great powers. This conception, sanctioned with the 
pressing for the restoration of the legitimate rulers, 
sources of moral and political concerns in general. Hence, he provided a ground for 
entitling all human beings as legitimate actors of international relations dynamics 
alongside with the states.  
Yet, after the imperialistic attempt of Napoleon, it began a process of strengthening of 
the role of the state’s sovereignty at the international level that will continue 
throughout the nineteenth and twenty century.  
In particular, at the 1814-15 Congress of Vienna, the notion of international co-
operation to promote ‘collective security’ originated from out of the idea of the so-
called ‘con
renewed treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, gave rise to the practice of the Congresses 
of Russia, Prussia, Austria and Britain for the control of the European political 
situation.  
This system which lasted for four international gatherings from Aix-la-Chapelle in 
1818 to Verona in 1822, resulted from out of the convergence at the Congress of the 
Austrian and English positions. The Austrian Chancellor Metternich, promoter of the 
European equilibrium, pushed toward a policy of concert for the government of the 
continent. On the point, despite the contrast between England and Austria about the 
principle of intervention, he found the full support of Castlereagh. The English 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, in fact, theorized the non-intervention in the domestic 
matters of the other states and, as such, he was well-disposed towards the theory of 
the equilibrium. The thought of the Austria-England axle finally resulted victorious 
making so concrete the new line of the equilibrium of the great states. On the ground 
of these assumptions, it was further considered essential to return they own territories 
to the legitimate sovereigns and, where this was not possible, to proceed according to 
the rules of the equilibrium. In this context, the skilful French Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Talleyrand, properly 
allowed the defeted-France not only to partecipate to the ‘inner negotiations’ of the 
Congress, but also to maintain a role of high profile as foundamental partener in the 
European balance of powers. 
In the reorganization of the continent the two leading axioms were thus, legitimacy 
and European equilibrium, where legitimacy has not to be intended as justice, but as 
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international accord on the ways and goals of the foreign politics. These two 
principles are well-exemplified by Henry Kissinger. About the concept of legitimacy, 
he said that “an order whose structure is accepted by all major powers is ‘legitimate’”. 
Moreover, he added, the order “must not seem oppressive or unacceptable to any 
major actors” because, if it does, that actor will pursue a “revolutionary” course49. 
him in a Holy Alliance to promote a 
                                                
While, as regards the equilibrium, he affirmed that “the security of a domestic order  
resides in the preponderant power of authority, that of the international order in the 
balance of forces and its expression, the equilibrium”50.  
With regards to the principle of sovereignty two main considerations can be made 
with respect to the system of Vienna. On one side, this strategy turned out into the 
enforcement of the principle of sovereignty. This was so, first, because the great states 
were the only recognized actors for the management of international issues. Secondly, 
because after the end of the Congress, the rulers of Europe wanted to stabilize the 
situation of compromise reached through the principle of legitimacy. In this sense, it 
was of primary importance to guarantee the regime of the European ‘states’. Apart 
from few exceptions, all the states had monarchic assets, only some of which with 
constitutions granted by the sovereigns. The majority were instead absolute 
monarchies, free form any tie with their own subjects or, as it begins to be intend after 
the French revolution, with their own citizens. Hence, to guarantee the existing 
regimes meant to guarantee the principle of legitimacy against the liberals and against 
all those people speaking of national or popular will in the attempt to limit the royal 
power. Properly at this aim, in the autumn of 1815, the Russian emperor Alexander I 
persuaded two other autocratic rulers among the victorious nations – the king of 
Prussia and the emperor of Austria – to join 
peaceful community of Christian countries. Europe was thus constrained to rely for it 
rearrangement upon reactionary criterions aimed at maintaining both the absolutistic 
and religious order and the dynastic principle.  
The second remark deals with the norm of non-intervention. As we have said, this 
idea was been conceptualized since the Peace of Westphalia, but the attempt of 
Napoleon and, more importantly, the need of stifling the liberal forces, put the notion 
under question. The main issue confronting both alliances was thus whether the 
powers should intervene when legitimate rulers were threatened by internal 
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revolution. The members of the Holy Alliance tended to say yes. Thus, for example, 
Austria won approval when intervening to protect the crowed heads of Naples and 
Piedmont in 1821. On the contrary, Britain was a strong supporter of non-
sity to use force in the international matters of 
 being decisively linked for both its duration and extent to 
intervention. It was on this ground that at the congress of Verona it opposed plans for 
intervention in Spain and Latin America, subsequently withdrawing from the 
Quadruple Alliance.  
This event brought the congress system officially to an end, leading to the division of 
Europe in those two opposing alliances, the Entente and the Central Powers which, 
assembled even though secret deals, will confront themselves during the First World 
War. Yet, the principle of regular cooperation between countries on international 
issues was been established and will not be forgotten. What Metternich and 
Castlereagh had succeeded in doing, it was to stabilize an order generally accepted 
that, properly in virtue of the relationships of strength, held latent the tensions and 
reduced to the minimum the neces
Europe. In the end, if one side the Congress of Vienna represented certainly a moment 
of internal political restoration, at the same time, it was a case of progress, crucially 
for the idea of ‘European concert’.   
However, the course of history has shown that this asset could not be durable. A first 
set of problems concern its organization. No stable institutions were established 
neither something was said about the timing of the occurrence of the congresses nor 
the kind of circumstances required for their call were clearly defined. Furthermore, 
the system had no common army and the enforcement of its decision was left to the 
military force of the single states. But these are relatively unimportant problems since 
when the situation was of particular concern the European powers demonstrated to be 
able to act quite promptly and efficaciously. Yet, the system’s own nature, in its 
timing and reasons of construction, constitute motives of weakness in itself. In fact, 
being created in response to the particular danger rose by Napoleon and being further 
developed as based on a coalition of states which assembled for specific threats, it was 
close to what we actually define a confederation. As such, it shared the defects 
associated with this and its
the contingent circumstances of the puzzle it is called to solve. In this sense, “history 
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teaches us […] that coalition begins to disintegrate from the moment that the common 
danger is removed”51.  
With respect to the basic questions of inclusion and participation which are here at 
sake, another crucial critique can be moved to the decision-making structure of 
Vienna. Beyond the fact that no rights were granted to the individuals as such, the 
decisions of the Congress were only made by the five great powers (Austria, France, 
Prussia, Russia and the United Kingdom), and even not all the countries of Europe 
could extend their rights at the Congress. For example, Italy became a mere 
eral Bonaparte had contributed to a progressive 
y for one or some of the parts involved. As consequence, it 
“geographical expression” as divided into eight parts under the control of different 
powers, while Poland was under the influence of Russia after the Congress. The 
arrangements that made the five great powers finally will lead to future disputes and 
instability.  
Finally, the Congress of Vienna preserved the balance of power in Europe, but it 
could not check the spread of revolutionary movements on the continent. A simple 
congress of states in fact could not eliminate the consequences of the Napoleonic 
period. The empire built by the gen
political and economic interdependence of the European continent that was ignored by 
the projects of the great powers. They simply attempted to put a dynamical industrial 
and financial situation which had its main centre in London, close to a stagnant and 
retrograde domestic conformation.  
In reaction to the inadequacy of this old view, the idea of the Nation come to 
substitute the dynastic principle as main justification of the earth’s division in separate 
polities. As matter of fact, in the second half of the nineteenth century, almost all the 
European sovereigns were constrained to grant their citizens a Constitution.  
The notion of the Nation was also particularly fitted with the needs of the emergent 
European business class. In this sense, the mercantilist accounts underlined the 
urgency of constructing national economic strategies to gain the highest benefits (and 
avoid the losses) in the international struggle for trade and markets. In other words, 
trade was profitable onl
would have been opportune for the nation-states to set policies that would have 
allowed them to be in the end in the number of the gainers. Trade was thereby a good 
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instrument for the growth of the nation’s well-being, but the right measures have to be 
employed by the state.  
However, the idea of free trade, sustained by the English since the last decades of the 
seventeenth century, proved to be widely successful. In this sense, the development of 
the liberal economic theory integrated the general favorable predisposition towards 
commerce with the stronger belief that trade was an advantageous enterprise for all 
those who engaged with it. In reason of this common gains, liberals inferred that two 
nations linked by a trade relationship were pushed to maintain peaceful bonds 
between them. Trade had thus not only a positive effect on the state’s wealth but, 
more significantly, it was regarded as a pacifying factor of international relations. In 
this context, the role reserved to the states was essentially intended in a negative 
acceptation. This meant that no international economic organization was thought to be 
ms of Europe. Crucially, 
necessary and the profitable dynamics of trade had more simply to be left alone to 
reveal themselves. Although, the socialists pointed out the links between the increase 
in the extent of the capital, and the enhance of militarism and imperialism in the 
Europe of the early twenty century, this kind of positions remained always a minority 
thought. Thus, even after the end of the First World War, the cause of the conflict was 
never associated with economic reasons and thus exclusively ascribed to the political 
modes commonly employed in international relations.  
The beginning of the tweenty century had seen the development of international law 
with the first Geneva conventions of 1899, establishing laws about humanitarian relief 
during war, and the 1907 international Hague Conventions, governing rules of war 
and the peaceful settlement of international disputes. But, these sets of norms had 
reveled itself as unsufficeint to restrain countries from a dramatic fighting. The 1914-
18 ‘Great War’ was indeed the first major conflict in Europe between industrialized 
countries and the first time that the mass industrial production was dedicated to war. It 
had a deep impact on the social, economic and political syste
despite it begun, as many wars in the past, as a conflict for the dominance in the 
European scenario, it turned into a global fight which moved the international political 
fulcrum towards the other side of the Atlantic. Its result was an unprecedented 
casualty level with eight million members of armed services and ten million civilian 
dead, thereby, inflicting also hard psychological and physical damages to the world. 
As consequence, strong anti-war sentiments rose across the globe and it was supposed 
that the First World War should have put an end to all wars.  
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At this aim, the origins of the conflict were largely investigated, however, as said, 
leaving out the economic realm from the sphere of the detected causes. In this sense, 
the preeminent idea was still that trade was a pacifying factor of the relations between 
states since it favored their interdependence and mutual benefits. The war was thus 
rather ascribed to the political structure of international relations. In particular, its 
system of alliances and secret diplomacy was hardly blamed since both it allowed the 
states to enter freely into war for their own benefit and pushed them into a never-
ending competition for military supremacy. The main remedy to this situation was 
believed to be the creation of an international organization, whose aim was to prevent 
future war through disarmament, open diplomacy, international co-operation, 
restrictions on the right to wage war, and penalties that made war unattractive to 
nations. United States President Woodrow Wilson enthusiastically promoted this idea 
as a means of avoiding any repetition of the disaster of the World War I. The creation 
of a League of Nations was thus one of the central innovations of Wilson's Fourteen 
Points for a peaceful world order. Specifically the final point provided: “a general 
association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of 
affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great 
and small states alike”52. The Paris Peace Conference, convened to build a lasting 
peace after the First World War, approved the proposal to create the League of 
Nations on 25 January 1919. The Covenant of the League of Nations was drafted by a 
special commission, and the League was established by Part I of the Treaty of 
Versailles. The League's goals encompassed disarmament, preventing war through 
collective security, settling disputes between countries through negotiation, diplomacy 
and improving global quality of life. But, they also included upholding the new found 
Rights of Man such as right of non-whites, rights of women, rights of soldiers, right of 
refugees53.    
The founding of the League of Nations seemed to realize concretely Kant’s project for 
a perpetual peace. As Habermas noticed, “Wilson never appealed directly to Kant’s 
work ‘Toward Perpetual Peace’,” but, the “intellectual debt to Kant is shown not only 
by the political goals but even more by the composition and organization of the 
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League of Nations”54. In the end, what Wilson attempted to do, in line with Kant’s 
suggestions, was to establish a league of nations with a clear liberal character. This 
trait is expressed, primarily, in its composition. On 28 June 1919, 44 states signed the 
Covenant, including 31 nations which had taken part in the war on the side of the 
Triple Entente or joined it during the conflict. At the same time, the defeated-
Germany and the communist Soviet Union were initially excluded from the League. 
Moreover, the setting of the system according to liberal terms was granted, first, by 
the leading role taken by the US for its same conceptualization. Then, after that the 
US withdraw its support to the League, it was endorsed by the central position held by 
France and the UK within the organization. According to Wilson’s intentions a league 
so constituted would have put on place a multilateral international apparatus. This 
structure, opportunely equipped with its own institutions, would have solved the 
controversies between its members though an arbitration which they voluntarily 
recognized as binding upon them. The basic idea here is the rejection of war and the 
substitution of violence with the rule of law as means for the resolution of the states 
disputes. In this respect, the prohibition of war overturned an essential feature of 
international law up to that point. Namely, the idea that the states were entitled to 
wage war almost at will, hence representing a gigantic step forward in international 
relations55. Moreover, the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles imposed a certain 
limitation of the state sovereignty to meet the rights of certain categories of 
individuals. Yet, Wilson’s project went further, bringing to the extreme consequences 
the Kantian assumption on the necessity of liberal domestic assets for the peaceful 
                                                
flow of the relations between states. In this sense, Wilson’s idea implied the 
realization of the peoples’ self-determination from the external, even trough the 
redefinition of the boundaries to create homogenous state-communities. In his 
conception, going along with the wishes of self-determination, for example, of most 
of the nationalities of the dissolved Austrian-Hungarian Empire, would have made the 
citizens of the new polities closer to the liberal political system. This would have 
further allowed the natural propensity of people toward peace to express itself, 
thereby, granting the necessary support for the League and its apparatus.  
Yet, as Francois Fejto noticed, the too faster break-up of the Austrian-Hungarian 
Empire and, more in general, the easy concession of the right of self-determination 
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without any attention to the minorities present in the new states, will generate 
properly does tensions that will bring to the Second World War and create situations 
of instability still not solved. However, more directly, the popular support gained in 
the course of 1920s and 1930s by the Fascist party in Italy and the Nazi party in 
 time as part of the League was 
Germany, dismissed in fact the basic assumptions of liberal internationalism. Finally, 
the outbreak of the Second World War demonstrated that the League had failed in its 
primary purpose which was to avoid any future world war. Again, the reasons of this 
failure may be connected to the origins and the general weakness of the organization.  
The origins of the League as an institution created by the Allied Powers as part of the 
peace settlement to end the First World War, led to it being viewed as a ‘league of 
victors’. It also tied the League to the Treaty of Versailles, so that when the Treaty 
became discredited and unpopular, this reflected on the League of Nations.  
Furthermore, the League's supposed neutrality tended to manifest itself as indecision. 
It required a unanimous vote of its nine-, later fifteen-, members of the Council to 
enact a resolution. Hence, conclusive and effective action was difficult, if not 
impossible. It was also slow in coming to its decisions as certain decisions required 
the unanimous consent of the entire Assembly. This problem mainly stemmed from 
the fact that the main members of the League of Nations were not willing to accept 
the possibility that their fate would be decided by other countries and had, therefore, 
in effect, by enforcing unanimous voting, given themselves the power of veto.  
Representation at the League was also often a problem. Though it was intended to 
encompass all nations, many never joined, or their
short. Most notably missing was the position that the United States of America was 
supposed to play in the League, not only in terms of helping to ensure world peace 
and security but also in financing the League. The U.S. President Woodrow Wilson 
had been a driving force behind the League's formation and strongly influenced the 
form it took, but the United States Senate voted not to join on 19 November 1919. 
Moreover, as already noticed, Germany and the Soviet Union initially were not 
allowed to join the League, the first because it was seen as the aggressor in the World 
War I, the second because of its communist views.  
The absence of the US accentuated another leak of the organization. The League of 
Nations, lacked an armed force of its own. It depended on the Great Powers to enforce 
its resolutions, keep to economic sanctions which the League ordered, or provide an 
army, when needed for the League to use. However, the Great Powers were often very 
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reluctant to do so. Sanctions could also hurt the League members, so they were 
unwilling to comply with them. The League's two most important powers after the 
withdraw of the US partecipation, Britain and France, were hesitant to use sanctions 
and even more disinclined to resort to military action on behalf of the League. 
Immediately after World War I, pacifism was a strong force both in the populations 
es they considered friends, and in a way that 
                                                
and the governments of the two countries. The British Conservatives were especially 
tepid on the League and preferred, when in government, to negotiate treaties without 
the involvement of the organization. Moreover, the League's advocacy of 
disarmament for Britain, France and its other members, while at the same time 
advocating collective security, meant that the League was unwittingly, depriving itself 
of the only forceful means by which its authority would be upheld. In fact, if the 
League was to force countries to abide by international law, it would require the 
Royal Navy and the French Army to do the enforcing.  
Finally, an important weakness grew from the contradiction between the idea of 
collective security, that formed the basis of the League, and international relations 
between individual states. The collective security system the League used meant that 
nations were required to act against stat
might endanger their national interests, to support states that they had no normal 
affinity with56. This weakness was exposed during the Abyssinia Crisis when Britain 
and France had to balance attempts to maintain the security they had attempted to 
create for themselves in Europe “in order to defend against the enemies of internal 
order”57, in which Italy's support played a pivotal role, with their obligations to 
Abyssinia as a member of the League. Ultimately, Britain and France both abandoned 
the concept of collective security in favour of appeasement in the face of growing 
German militarism under Adolf Hitler.  
With the oubreak of the Second World War, the League of Nations simply faded away 
between the humiliation of seeing one of its members, Austria, taken over by 
Germany in 1938 without even a formal protest, and the absurdity of expelling the 
USSR after the outbreak of World War Two in 1939 (an event that neither the USSR 
nor the League were involved in). It was properly in reason of its ineffectiveness that, 
when the Allies finally began to prepare for the end of World War Two, they rejected 
any idea of restoring the League. Instead, they moved to establish a new organisation, 
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the United Nations. At this aim, representatives of fifty countries met in San Francisco 
at the United Nations Conference on International Organization to draw up the United 
Nations Charter. Those delegates deliberated on the basis of proposals worked out by 
the representatives of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United 
States at Dumbarton Oaks, United States in August-October 1944. The Charter was 
signed on 26 June 1945 by the representatives of the 50 countries. Poland, which was 
not represented at the Conference, signed it later and became one of the original 51 
Member States. The United Nations officially came into existence on 24 October 
1945, when the Charter had been ratified by China, France, the Soviet Union, the 
United Kingdom, the United States and by a majority of other signatories. In parallel 
with the organization of the political international relations, the negotiators this time 
did not fail to take notice even of the economic sectors and the questions related to it. 
At this aim, they assembled in Bretton Woods on July 1944 to establish common rules 
for trade and financial relations. From out of this the first example in the world history 
of a totally-shared monetary order was developed to regulate the monetary relations 
among independent nation-states. At the same time, the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank was created to give stability to the implemented system of fixed 
exchanges based on the US dollar. Then, in 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs 
 the old League's aims and methods were transmitted 
and Trade was signed to liberalize the international commerce. The structure created 
at Bretton Woods were able to support the international economic relations and thus 
resist unchanged till 1971, when the Smithsonian Agreement marked the end of the 
gold exchange standard and the beginning of a system of flexible exchanges. It is 
however noteworthy that the institutions ideated at Bretton Woods survived after the 
end of gold standard. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are still 
active, while the General Agreement was substituted by the World Trade 
Organization in the 1995.    
However, a significant number of
into the new organisation in 1945. Among these were not only such key and effective 
institutions as the International Court and the International Labour Organisation, but 
also the working assumptions of the secretariat, and some key operations - including 
those that would soon come to be called ‘peacekeeping’ operations. Most notably, the 
strongest line of conjunction between the two organizations stands in the survival of 
the motive and sustaining force of the more general process began in Vienna. This 
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meant, the strengthening of the expectation of international involvement in the 
preservation of global security.  
Their inclusiveness in terms of membership and the equal votes that all states received 
in the assemblies reflect the principles of universality and equality among states on 
which the organizations were built. In order to deal with their main goal of 
international security, both organizations embraced the principle of collective 
security. In this sense, an aggression by one state against another would trigger a 
collective response against the aggressor state by all members of the organization. The 
similarities across the  two systems can also be found in the rules that were shaped by 
these common principles. The principle of collective security in fact led to similarities 
in the rules regarding the type of collective responses that could be taken against 
aggressor states. Both allowed for peaceful means to resolve disputes among states. 
They both also included procedures through which states could become subject to 
economic sanctions and to collective military action. The organizations also 
envisioned inspection mechanisms to control aggressive states that were deemed to 
have reached dangerously high levels of armament.  
As the League and the UN embraced similar major principles and rules, they were 
both confronted with the same kind of tensions between some of the principles and 
the need to build effective organizations, as well as between the principles 
themselves. One such tension developed between the principle of universality and the 
need to have a more effective (that is, smaller and more flexible) forum for dealing 
with urgent threats to international security. However, as soon as such a forum was 
considered, the organizations also had to deal with the question of its membership. 
The founders of both system recognized that great powers should be permanent 
members of such a forum because they were the principal potential enforcers of 
collective decisions. Yet, the structure of the United Nations was to give a much 
stronger position to the traditional great powers through the UN Security Council. The 
power of veto on the decisions of the Council was thus assigned only to the five 
permanent members. At the same time, the requirement of the unanimity vote was 
changed in favour of a majority system (of nine on fifteen). This has led to a second 
tension, one between the principle of equality among state and the principles of power 
politics. At the same time, the strengthening of the effectiveness of the organization 
determined also the departure from the principle of strict neutrality which was usually 
enforced by the League. Examples of this change are offered by the UN operations in 
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those states that were dissolving into civil war, as, for instance, in Congo from 1960 
to 1964. Dealing with such internal fights was a more ambitious and demanding task 
than the traditional role of assisting consenting states to observe ceasefires.  Last, but 
not least, both organizations had to deal with the tension between the principle of 
collective security, which implies that a state may have to conform to the general will 
of other members, and the principle of sovereignty, which implies that there is no 
higher authority than the state. In this respect, an important difference between the 
norms of the interwar era and the present-day ones is evident in terms of the 
understanding of sovereignty. Even though the principle of sovereignty remained 
important after World War II, its power has somewhat eroded. Thus, for example, in 
the interwar era, primarily because of the UK objections to weapons inspections in 
Germany, the League's Disarmament Committee was never truly able to function. The 
UK position was based on the normative argument that, as long as the Treaty of 
Versailles returned sovereignty to Germany, it was not appropriate to undermine such 
sovereignty with disclosure requirements. In contrast, the multiple inspections the UN 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency performed in Iraq, as well as in other 
countries, suggest a change in the balance between norms supporting state sovereignty 
and the need to create effective organizations. But, the most often cited example of 
provisions on which it is grounded. In this respect, many constitutionalists have 
such erosion is related to the emergence and increasing relevance of the human rights 
regime. This system assigned to individuals a sets of rights that can be exhibited and 
should be respected, independently from any state membership, in the recognition of 
the essential universal equality of all human beings. Properly in virtue of the 
acknowledgement of the intrinsic value of humanity, the recent institution of the 
International Criminal Court has further weakened the notion of international 
sovereignty. This has indeed put under question one of its more ensured implications, 
namely, the immunity of the rulers for the actions performed in the course of their 
mandate.  
The constant increasing of the number of its members, which nowadays comprises all 
world countries, together with the enhance of its competences, which took place in 
parallel with the strengthening of the globalization, have widely modified the 
perception of the UN apparatus. In this sense, it is no more regarded simply as an 
arrangement of international relations between states, but, more significantly, as a 
system of global governance. The reason of this general success stands certainly in the 
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asserted the possibility to considered the UN Charter as the premise for a Constitution 
of the whole international society58, pushing thus forward the Kantian dreams for a 
osmopolitan order. At the same time, the increase of its ability of both holding global 
sponsibility and obtaining general trust was due the apparent ‘democratization’ of 
 decade of US domination. Although after the end of the Cold 
ar, many were the hopes for a further extension of this process, the question of the 
c
re
the organization decisively implemented in the 1950s, as the General Assembly began 
to assert itself after a
W
UN reform (in democratic terms) is currently object of strong quarrel which often 
undermines the trust on the system and its capability to deal independently with the 
great powers.  
 
 
2.2. Something goes wrong in the current system of global governance: the 
‘democratic deficit’  
 
In respect with the question of the UN democratization, the advocates of 
Cosmopolitan Democracy stress the argument that the state-centered logic which still 
nowadays characterizes the world political arrangement favors more the 
representation of the state-interests than of those of the individual citizens. In this 
respect, Archibugi argued, “the state governments[,including, crucially, those 
democratic,]have shown to be too weak or even too much conniving at an imperialist 
world policy view to oppose against it”. Moreover, he continued, “the existing 
international organizations, starting with the United Nations, are essentially inter-
governmental and they don’t possess yet the necessary legitimacy to oppose to the 
dominant states.”59 Although we are far from living in an anarchical international 
scenario still, in the normative literature on global governance and, particularly, in the 
strain of Cosmopolitan Democracy, the present system is regarded as distorted in so 
far as it reflects a hierarchy of power which too frequently promotes the interests of 
the most powerful states and global social forces at the expense of the majority of 
world inhabitants.60 As Patrick Hayden noticed, “participation in the creation of 
government policy that some citizens enjoy in the internal affairs of their respective 
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countries and the accountability provided by democratic elections do not extend 
similarly to international affairs, leading to widespread concerns about what is 
referred to as the ‘democratic deficit’ of global governance”61. In this regards, 
Archibugi denounced that many decisions taken at the global level, while they grandly 
affect the world inhabitants lives, lack of any significant accountability and are rather 
taken by “hidden operators over whom neither individuals nor the states they belong 
exert any control”62. “This is the real deficit of democracy”, he better clarified, “the 
existence of organized transnational interests far removed from any popular 
mandate”63. In the last stance, then, these authors suggest that we actually live a 
gigantic contradiction. On one side, the democratic system of political organization 
spreads quantitatively becoming the predominant form of government and the only 
legitimated one in most of the world states. But, on the other side, democracy failed in 
affirming its regulative principles and values at the international arena. “In one word, 
democracy got important goals within the states, but of little relevance in the 
international sphere”64. Moreover, according to these thinkers, the situation is further 
exacerbated because of the strengthening of the processes of ‘globalization’. Thus, 
while the destiny of world political communities overlaps every day more intensively 
making the boundaries between outside and inside ever weaker, the chance for the 
state to succeed in dealing with questions which no more can be governed by a simple 
borders-based logic, drastically decreases65. In other words, the state centrism which 
s and their enforcement at 
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it grows international 
scenario an s of an 
internatio  globe. This 
is particu h should see 
governm
With resp
                                                
traditionally characterizes the representation of the interest
th
f the state’s capability of resolution66. As consequence of this po
the distance between the intergovernmental management of the 
d the true needs of the real interest-holders, namely, the citizen
nal society which tends progressively to coincide with the whole
larly striking in a world mainly led by democracies which as suc
ent as representative and responsible.  
ect to this aspect of the question, Hayden wrote,  
 
61Hayden, footnote n.9, p. 23   
 (my trans.) 
ridge Polity Press, Cambridge, 2002, 
o, Bologna, 2005 
my trans.) 
62Archibugi, footnote n.2,  p.322
63Archibugi, footnote n.60, p.9  
64D. Archibugi, La democrazia cosmopolitica, Asterios Editore, 2000, p. 16 (my trans.)   
65D. Held and a. G. McGrew, Governing the Globalization, Camb
trans it, Governare la Globalizzazione, il Mulin
66Archibugi, footnote n.2, p. 323 (
 57
 
The new supernational layers of governance created by the nation-states 
seeking to promote or regulate the effects of globalization generally have 
few mechanisms of accountability accessible to the general population; 
these global institutions are for the most part accountable only to states and 
operate according to nondemocratic principles (disproportionately to any 
popular size). Other influential global actors, whether from the private 
sector (transnational corporations) or from civil society (nongovernmental 
organizations), are also often unaccountable to or unrepresentative of a 
variety of members of international society.67   
 
Relying upon an analogous analysis of the contemporary arrangement of international 
relations, Held and McGrew further extended the point underlining a surprising 
feature of politics outside the borders. They noticed the contrast between the 
substantial failure of the political global asset and the considerable success of public 
and private agencies in promoting economic globalization68. According to Ulrich 
Beck, this is because while the transnational economic interests and the military 
power may rely upon well-functioning global organizations, the political parties are 
still expression of a national logic69. As regards this incongruity, Archibugi sentenced 
that “the forms of political representation have remained unbearab
the frontiers of the state even in an epoch in which the civil and
ly confined within 
 economic society 
works thickly on a transnational base.”70 In conclusion, according to the perspective 
of Cosmopolitan Democracy, the contemporary global governance system as mainly 
based on the principle of nation-state sovereignty not only shows itself to be unable to 
master phenomena more and more not only universal but global. But, at the same 
time, it crystallizes at the global arena a situation of ‘democratic deficit’. This gets 
substance in the simultaneous lack of any accountability granted to the main 
international operators with respect to the world citizens, and the almost complete 
negation of any possible representation of the latter’s own reasons. 
If the previous account of both the international relations dynamic and the impact of 
recent global changes is accepted, then the argument can be taken in a number of 
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directions. In particular, the supporters of Cosmopolitan Democracy have argued for 
the democratization of international relations. Their position is that the automatic 
association which traditionally is supposed to link the nation-state and democracy 
must be broken. Since the power to affect things no longer exists at national level, the 
idea of self-rule, proper of a democratic regime, must be redirected towards global 
institutions. As above noted, the UN and other inter-state bodies are, at the moment, 
in no sense democratic. In response to this situation, these authors argue in favor of a 
program of political reform in which these institutions are gradually democratized and 
an active role for individuals is progressively recognized. In this sense, the idea of the 
advocates of Cosmopolitan Democracy is that of spreading democracy not only within 
but even between and above the states. After all, from an historical point of view, 
Archibugi stated echoing Stephen Krasner, sovereignty has been an artificial creation, 
n “organized hypocrisy” that in few cases succeeded in setting limits to the extra-
territor is no 
[immed tain if 
a genocide is comm
interfer  
and ge o this 
evidenc  for a 
general cy and 
the sovereignty principle and, conseque  
ropos, he said,  
utions”. […] Experience teaches that, in 
absence of institutions and procedures fitted to guarantee real humanitarian 
a
ial interests of the states.71 In fact, he elsewhere clarified, “there 
iate and direct] threat to the state-interests of Italy, France, or Great Bri
itted in Iraq, Iran, or Turkey”72. Rather than assuring the non-
ence principle, the sovereignty criteria has more manifestly allowed massacres
nocides to be perpetuated with impunity within the states. In response t
e, Archibugi called, in unison with Luigi Ferraioli’s point of view,
 recognition of the clean contraposition between the notion of democra
ntly, for the abandon of the latter.73 At this
p
 
If the protection of human life is one of the main inspiring criterions of the global 
political system’s architecture, […then], it is necessary to replace the category of 
sovereignty with that of the global constitutionalism, in which the use of the 
international strength, especially when turned to domestic problems, is not only 
deliberated but also managed by global instit
interventions, it is better that the (western) states abstain from the use of strength. 
But, [at the same time], this imposes to seek non-violent tools of interference with 
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the purpose to prevent genocides, to defend human rights and even to affirm the right 
of the people to choose his/her own government.74 
 
he democratic paradox is thus in the end, the crux that intellectuals, in the first place, 
    
T
are call to clear up if we want to obstacle the concentration of power and impede to a 
simple strength-based logic to have the upper hand in the international scenario at the 
expense of wide-spread sufferings. In this respect, as Archibugi explained advocating 
what he calls a ‘cosmopolitical democracy’: 
 
Above all, what distinguishes cosmopolitical democracy from other such projects is 
its attempt to create institutions which enable the voice of individuals to be heard in 
global affairs, irrespective of their resonance at home. Democracy as a form of 
global governance thus needs to be realized on three different interconnected level: 
within states, between states and at a world level.75    
 
It results evident from this clarification that what Comopolitan Democracy plans is 
certainly not the abandon of the state. Neither it prefigures its imminent collapse nor 
would welcome its eventual disappearance. Rather, according to this view, the state 
will appropriately remain an institution of terrific importance in the general schema of 
the world political organization. At the same time, it will keep its role of privileged 
referent of individuals’ instances and main place where many of those needs could 
find an adequate satisfaction. In fact, as Archibugi put out, the state is not necessarily 
a democratic institution but without a recognized institution as the only authorized 
one to the legitimated use of force, democracy would not be possible76. Moreover, he 
further admonished, a cosmopolitan democracy cannot be built either “destroying that 
existing within states” or simply turning the model of domestic democracy as such at 
the international level. What these theorists rather proposed, then, is a deeper and 
wider “imaginative effort akin to that of two centuries ago, when we shifted from 
direct to representative democracy”77. This call for a radical change gets substance in 
pressing the global organization to “add a level of governance” to the already existing 
national and international stages. This further addition aims at providing individuals 
with a “more active role” that will be endorsed in the recognition and exert in virtue 
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of their “double function […] of citizens within their belonging state and […] citizens 
of the world.” In this sense, Archibugi said, “the cosmopolitical democracy suggests 
to create institutions and representative channels for all individuals […]  to make the 
instances of citizens directly represented in the global affairs. This means to found the 
deliberation on the global matters starting from the more (the majority).”78 More 
comprehensively then the final priority of Cosmopolitan Democracy appears double. 
n one side, it is necessary “to address [the conflicts at global level] towards a global 
onstitutionalism and submit them to jurisdictional organisms, as Kelsen had already 
tial to establish components of what Held called “cosmopolitan 
democracy law” or, “a democratic public law entrenched within and across 
my what 
Archibugi termed “the by-now-Baroque category of sovereignty”81, the normative 
founda
                                                
O
c
wished, that should act on the base of an explicit constitutional mandate”79. On the 
other side, it is essen
borders”80. In this respect, in place of putting as bulwark of people’s autono
tion of cosmopolitan democracy law proposes to rely upon what Held referred 
to as “the principle of autonomy” which requires that all individuals have the ability 
to participate in political decisions that directly impact upon them82.  
 
 
2.3 Recent failures in the global governance system: concentrated  power and wide-
spread suffering 
 
a) Political puzzles: super power nationalism,  unilateralism, ethnocentrism  
 
Since 11 September 2001, it has been said, the world is changed and, along 
with it, we are ourselves no more the same. Quite soon, the worry for the displaying 
of the anti-Taliban ‘war of coalition’ has been added to the astray and pain of the 
Towers tragedy’s aftermath. All this was followed, in the proceeding of the events, by 
the suffering of the population of both sides for the resulting deaths and the angst of 
most of the observers. The war in Afghanistan has become the first act of a more 
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general US strategy of ‘global war on terror’ ideated in response to “an unprecedented 
transnational phenomenon”, differing “markedly from other guerrilla or terrorist 
group”83, Al Qaeda. The same feelings has been almost replayed during the US-led 
invasion of Iraq (2003), but at this time going with a more enhanced sentiment of 
condemn and refuse for a war from many parts judged as unilateral, unlawful and 
unjustified. While the manifestations of dissent of the civil society followed one after 
the other from Europe to Asia to the American continent, touching the same U.S., the 
international political community limited its response to generic declarations of 
condemn expressed by single states. More than any decisive influence on the state of 
affairs, these denounces showed the inability of the international political community 
to express a common position. At the same, they demonstrated the powerlessness of 
the settled international institutions and mechanisms to deal successfully with the 
situation. This is particularly striking because serious doubts exists indeed on the 
international legacy of the war in Iraq. In fact, as Jürgen Habermas noticed, “the war 
was neither a case of self-defense against an actual attack or the immediate threat of 
one, nor it was authorized by any decision of the Security Council according to 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Neither Resolution 1441 nor any of the seventeen 
previous (and “spent”) resolutions on Iraq can count as a sufficient authorization.” On 
the other hand, “the same US president Bush repeatedly declared his intention of 
reason – had placed on their realization”84.  
acting without the mandate of the UN if necessary.” The neoconservatives, Habermas 
continued, offered a real ‘revolutionary alternative’ “to the domestication of state 
power through international law. […I]f the regime of international law fails,” they 
stated, “then the hegemonic imposition of a global liberal order is justified, even by 
means that are hostile to international law.” More significantly, Habermas put out, 
“what distinguishes the neoconservatives from the “realist” school of international 
relations is the vision of an America global political order that has definitively broken 
with the reformist program of UN human rights policies. While not betraying liberal 
goals, this vision [ha]s shatter[ed] the civil limits that the UN Charter – with good 
Today, even many of those that at the first time shared the US new neoconservative 
international doctrine of ‘good consequences at any cost’ seem to acknowledge that 
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“when you look back on the Iraq war and study it and study particularly the neglect 
and the failure to manage the aftermath, it's hard to look at it as a good thing”85. In 
fact, despite the announced proclaims and declared good intentions of a war waged 
“to disarm Iraq, to free its people, and to defend the world from grave danger”86, it 
turned, day by day more evidently, more into a puzzle than a solution. Iraq, although 
by now clearly devoid of the alleged weapons of mass destruction and out of 
Saddam’s dictatorship, is far from being disarmed. Rather, the guerrilla attacks 
together with the coalition military operations make their shocking voice always heard 
throughout the nation. Iraqis are distant from a free existence, if we share the idea that 
the concept has to encompass at least a basic degree of daily security and autonomy of 
choice. Finally, the record the Iraq war marked in the panorama of the international 
law and state relational procedures leaves the sensation that it has raised a danger to 
the world order graver than the one it purposed to remove. As if this was not enough, 
the international terrorism far from being disrupted continues its action not only 
within the conflict zones but on world scale as in Bali (2002), Madrid (2004), London 
(2005), Sharm el-Sheikh (2005), and Mumbai (2008). Along with its serious after 
effects in the field of human rights of which Guantanamo is only the most known 
sign, this puts serious doubts on the efficacy of a global military approach to terror.  
The U.S. President-elect Barack Obama has promised a “new dawn of American 
leadership” that will be marked by much greater emphasis on diplomacy and 
multilateralism than was accorded by George W. Bush. As announced by President 
Obama, the new US foreign policy will be twofold. In order “to keep the American 
people safe and to assure prosperity here at home and peace abroad […] we have to 
combine military power with strengthened diplomacy,” he said. What has to be put on 
place, he further clarified, is “a new strategy that skillfully uses, balances, and 
integrates all elements of American power: our military and diplomacy; our 
intelligence and law enforcement; our economy and the power of our moral example.” 
In an implicit repudiation of Bush's unilateralism, he repeatedly stressed U.S. 
interdependence with the rest of the world, noting that all of the challenges faced by 
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Washington were linked by “the fundamental reality that in the 21st century, our 
destiny is shared with the world's.” This fundamental recognition made necessary, 
according to his view, “to build and forge stronger alliances around the world so that 
we're not carrying the burdens and these challenges by ourselves.” The same 
multilateral commitment to foreign issues is further stressed by different members of 
Obama’s team. “We know our security, our values, and our interests cannot be 
protected and advanced by force alone nor, indeed, by Americans [alone]” declared 
the Secretary of State Hilary Clinton. Vice President-elect Joseph Biden, another 
likely player in the White House foreign policy debate, echoed the same themes. 
Citing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the emergence of new powers, the dangers of 
non-proliferation, scarcities of basic resources, the impact of climate change, and the 
are considered strong personalities whose views are seen as generally more hawkish 
than Obama's. Indeed, those picks have caused growing concern among some of 
persistence of poverty, he noted that “no one country can control these forces 
[alone]”87. In line with this new cooperative climate the US administration is making 
an effort to rebuild US alliance around the world. There are indications of the US 
intention to improve relations and reopen dialogue with Syria, Iran and North Korea, 
and even with parts of the Taliban. Particularly on the latter, the US President 
suggested his administration will consider reaching out to moderate elements of the 
Taliban, much as the American military did with Sunni militias in Iraq. In this sense, 
Mr. Obama pointed to the success in peeling Iraqi insurgents away from more hard-
core elements of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. A strategy that many credit to mean 
turning the war around in the last two years, or, in the words of the US President 
himself, “responsibly ending the war in Iraq through a successful transition to Iraqi 
control”88.  
Yet, despite the declared and praiseworthy intent, the successful employment of this 
new multilateral foreign plan have to overcome some hard obstacles that could 
undermine its scope. Problems exist indeed within the same Obama’s establishment. 
First, the three main foreign policy-making appointments, Clinton, Gates, and Jones, 
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Obama's veteran supporters who rallied to his candidacy in major part due to his early 
and outspoken opposition, especially in contrast to Clinton, to the Iraq war. “He really 
differentiated himself in the [Democratic primary campaign] in his opposition to the 
war in Iraq,” noted Christopher Preble, a foreign policy analyst at the libertarian Cato 
Institute, “and yet he hasn't reached out to a genuine outsider like he was himself not 
so long ago”89. Conversely, a number of right-wing figures have hailed the 
nominations, particularly Clinton's, as better than expected. “I'm relieved,” neo-
conservative Richard Perle declared. “Contrary to expectations, I don't think we 
would see a lot of change.” Neo-conservatives have been particularly enthusiastic 
about Clinton's appointment, noting that “she was the most hawkish […] of all the 
Democratic presidential candidates over the past year”90. In second place, despite the 
opening of a new policy of dialogue, the president talks about the struggle with 
terrorism in Afghanistan and elsewhere, staking out positions that at times seemed 
more comparable to those of his predecessor than many of Mr. Obama’s more liberal 
supporters would like. In particular, he did not rule out the option of snatching 
terrorism suspects out of hostile countries. On the contrary, he explicitly left open the 
option for American operatives to capture terrorism suspects abroad even without the 
cooperation of a country where they were found. In this sense, he stated that “there 
could be situations — and I emphasize ‘could be’ because we haven’t made a 
determination yet — where, let’s say that we have a well-known Al Qaeda operative 
that doesn’t surface very often, appears in a third country with whom we don’t have 
an extradition relationship or would not be willing to prosecute, but we think is a very 
dangerous person.” In addition, Obama emphasized that “we don't torture” and that he 
will ensure to “provide anybody that we're detaining an opportunity through habeas 
corpus to answer to charges”91. But, according to the Times, the US President-elect 
even made clear that “aides did not mean to suggest that everybody held by American 
forces would be granted habeas corpus or the right to challenge their detention.” In 
line with this position, in fact, in a court filing on 20 February 2009, the Obama 
administration agreed with the Bush administration position that 600 prisoners in a 
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cavernous prison on the American air base at Bagram in Afghanistan have no right to 
seek their release in court92. Furthermore, shifting to a different level, other dilemmas 
are posed by the US administration strategy in itself. On one side, for what concern 
Iraq, it has to be noted that the programmed withdrawal of troops would take place in 
a country however not at all pacified, neither unified, nor democratic. Consequently 
even though the withdrawal of US troops will sound as the ending of the US military 
task still this will not sign the end of the violence for Iraqis. Moreover, what President 
Obama calls a ‘sustainable presence’ implicitly disavows in some way the idea of a 
rapid and complete removal of the US fighting forces from the field, whose 
accomplishment should take 16 months at most according to the President’s plan93. In 
contrast, its very idea predicts that smaller force will be in Iraq for many years. Until 
at least 2015 according to many Iraq US veterans94. On the other hand, with respect to 
Afghanistan, President Obama recognized that in comparison to Iraq, “the situation in 
Afghanistan is, if anything, more complex,.” In fact, he noted “you have [there] a less 
governed region, a history of fierce independence among tribes. Those tribes are 
multiple and sometimes operate at cross purposes, and so figuring all that out is going 
to be much more of a challenge”95. Preliminary discussions between the Afghanistan 
government and the Taliban leadership were already under way and certainly they 
could be developed into more formal talks with the support of the United States. The 
current discussions represent a step beyond the established policy, which is supported 
by NATO and Afghanistan’s foreign allies, of fighting the irreconcilable elements of 
the Taliban while leaving the door open for those ready to accept the Constitution, 
disarm and return to peaceful civilian life. To this end, the Afghanistan government 
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has conducted a reconciliation effort that however is widely regarded as corrupt and 
ineffective. While it has brought more than 6,000 former Taliban members to the 
government’s side over the years, the Times noticed, it has failed to win the defection 
of any senior figures or to make a serious dent in the ranks of the Taliban. Several 
Western diplomats and officials in Afghanistan including those already in contact 
with the Taliban, the New York journal further reported, are calling for a far broader 
political engagement with the Taliban. They say that trying to engage moderate 
Taliban factions and splitting commanders or groups away from the Taliban 
leadership also would not work. On the contrary they suggest, according to the Times 
article, that negotiations have to be conducted with broad consultation among the 
Taliban leadership and through Pashtun tribal leaders and elders, since the Taliban are 
                                                
all ethnic Pashtun and ultimately answerable to their tribes. “What is required is 
structured engagement with all Afghan communities, including the Pashtun and 
therefore representatives of the Taliban, around a new political project”96. Finally, a 
part from any possible analysis or stated declaration, the overwhelming prominence of 
the military aspect on the diplomatic one is clearly and significantly further testified 
by the US President-elect recent announce that 17,000 extra Marines and Army 
infantries will be implied in Afghanistan to battle a growing counter-insurgency97. 
President Obama's escalation is just party of a strategy that could double the number 
of coalition military in Afghanistan to counter what he judges a deteriorating situation 
in the country. In the mid time, the gross amount of casualties of both Iraq and 
Afghanistan conflicts has reached the frightening number of 700,000 killed and 
1,500,000 injured98. 
 
96Carlotta Gall, As U.S. Weighs Taliban Negotiations, Afghans Are Already Talking, The New York 
Times, March 11, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/world/asia/11taliban.html?_r=1&ref=world, a version of this 
article appeared in print on March 11, 2009, on page A8 of the New York edition.    
97The White House, Statement by the President on Afghanistan, Office of the Press Secretary, 
Washington,  17 February, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-by-the-
President-on-Afghanistan/; for further information on  the new Afghan strategy of President Obama see 
Peter Mansbridge, U.S. will respect trade pacts 'as we always have': ObamaU.S. president says he'll 
discuss 'comprehensive' Afghanistan strategy with PM, the President Obama interview at the White 
House on February 17, 2009 told the Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/02/17/obama-cbc.html; for an account of the forces compound, 
and their deployment,  see also, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29242187/    
98The data are approximated for defect and updated at the 25th January 2009. The amount comprises 
troops, civilians, contractors and journalists. For a more detailed account of the victims of the Iraq and 
Afghanistan conflicts see. http://www.unknownnews.net/casualties.html  
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Almost contemporarily with these events, in the Middle East, the violence begun with 
the explosion of the Second Intifada in the 2000, protracted itself until 2004. Although 
the resumption of a sterile dialogue between the Israeli government and the new 
elected presidency of the Palestinian authority, the electoral victory of the armed 
Islamic party of Hamas on January and the following capture of a caporal of the 
Israeli army on June 2006, contribute to maintain high the tension. But, it was the 
overall situation in the area not to be pacific. In the interlude between one alarming 
declaration of annihilation of the Jewish state from part of the Iran president and a 
new development in the international debate on alleged future Iran nuclear threats, the 
sudden deflagration of the Israel-Lebanon conflict took place during the summer 
2006. The unusual as much as opportune intervention of the international community 
has brought in that occasion to a pacified status granted by an international force of 
interposition. Yet, less more than one year later, the bloodily internal fight between 
Fatah and Hamas delivered to Israel “a new enemy entity” to struggle causing in 
response to the conquest of the Hamas forces of the supremacy on Gaza a severe 
embargo to the Gaze population. Finally, following the death of an Israeli civilian, 
killed by a rocket fired at Netivot, Israel launched an air offensive it named “Cast 
Lead” on 27 December 2008, before opening a ground operation from 3 January 
2009. Once again, the international political community exhibited its incapacity to 
intervene concretely in the question. Unfruitful diplomatic efforts came one after the 
other addressed from time to time by the members of the Quartet on the Middle 
Orient, US, Russia, UN and EU, form French, as president on duty of the EU, and 
from Turkey, as the first Israeli trade partner in the Gulf area. While the Arab League 
was explicitly denouncing the delay of the UN in calling the Security Council, the UN 
restricted its action to the declaration of the President of the General Assembly 
Miguel d'Escoto Brockmann who condemned the Israeli attack as ‘an aggression 
without restrain’. No appropriate operative response however were furnished by the 
Security Council. The same Council statement, finally issued on 28 December, was 
completely insufficient because in no way it contributed to solve the controversy or to 
stop the violence. Neither it made reference to any violations of the international law 
and human rights of which in the meantime were accused, particularly, the Israeli 
99Army but, similarly, the militants of Hamas . These took in important pillars of 
                                                 
99In absence of journalists and international observers, first to speak of violations, in particular on the 
use of not conventional weapons, were the Palestinian bloggers. The denounces were then picked up by 
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international humanitarian law, including violations of the Geneva Conventions. In 
particular, both obligations of an occupying force to protect an occupied population, 
and the broader requirements of the laws of war that prohibit specific acts, including 
the illegal use of traditional and experimental weapons, the use of human shields, 
collective punishment, and civilian targeting. The statement limited itself only to 
equate the culpability of the occupying power and of the counter forces for the 
violence. It is not by chance, then, if the violence stopped, after 22 days of conflict, 
only when the Israeli security cabinet, on 17 January, decided autonomously to adopt 
a resolution in favor of an unilateral ceasefire in Gaza. The last Israeli soldiers 
withdrew from the Gaza Strip on 21 January 2009, the day after the inauguration of 
the new US president, Barack Obama.    
“It may not be very clear who actually won this conflict – if such a concept means 
anything in Gaza – but I think it is pretty clear who lost, and that was the civilian 
population of Gaza and, to a much lesser extent, the civilian population of southern 
Israel”, John Holmes, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and 
Emergency Relief Coordinator, said at the OCHA-UNRWA Headquarters press 
briefing on the 19th January, 2009. According to the United Nations, the Israeli 
offensive left 1,330 dead (including 431 children and 112 women) and 5,380 
wounded. That brought the total number of dead and injured to over 6,700 on the 
Palestinian side. More than 4,000 homes were entirely destroyed in Israeli attacks and 
more than 17,000 others were damaged, according to an estimate from the Palestinian 
Authority’s central statistics bureau, which calculates the losses at more than two 
billion dollars100. On the Israeli side, 4 civilians and 10 soldiers had been killed and 
84 injured during the recent military operation, while 3,000 Palestinian rockets have 
hit the Israel territory since the beginning of the 2008 causing the dead of 8 people in 
that year101. Evidently, the claims for security from part of the Israeli people pose 
                                                                                                       
urgent questions about their full satisfaction but, at the same time, raise strong 
                                     
port of the UN Press Conference On Gaza Humanitarian Situation can be found on 
the British daily newspaper Times, by the international organization Human Right Watch, and by 
several foreign physicians who explicitly spoke of the employ of white phosphor and the experimental 
use of new potent explosive devices called Dime.    
100A full re
http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/361eea1cc08301c485256cf600606959/1cdd241153ed6c62852575440
04fe09f!OpenDocument. Other statistical information about the Palestinian territories can be found on 
http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/   
101According to the Israeli military's count on December 27. For a more detailed and general account of 
Israeli victims see. http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-  
+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Victims+of+Palestinian+Violence+and+Terrorism
     
+sinc.htm  
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concerns for the methods implied by the Israeli government that too often resolve into 
humanitarian crisis suffered on the Palestinian front. Nowadays, the increasing 
political influence obtained by the extremist right wing at the ultimate Israeli elections 
(February 2009) contrasts with the estimated growing popular favor gained by Hamas 
in the Strip after the Israeli military operation. These considerations actually made the 
agreement proposals of Annapolis102 less than a mere utopia and their realization 
seems to be entrusted more to messianic hopes in the new US government than to 
concrete and effective opportunities. On the other hand, the Israeli intervention for 
many international observers have been addressed more against the Obama 
administration than to Hamas. The Washington Post quoted a Bush administration 
official saying that Israel struck in Gaza “because they want it to be over before the 
                                                
next administration comes in. They can't predict how the next administration will 
handle it. And this is not the way they want to start with the new administration”103. 
The Israeli officials may or may not be right about President Obama's likelihood of 
responding differently than Bush on this issue. In any case, the escalation in Gaza will 
make virtually impossible any serious Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The current 
crisis means that any negotiations, whether ostensibly Israeli-Palestinian alone or 
officially involving the so-called Quartet will not be able to go beyond a return to the 
pre-airstrike crisis period. A moment in any case of political crisis still far from being 
solved.   
Only few months before the occurrence of this events, in Europe, just at the door of 
the Union, the Russian intervention in Georgia in the 2008 officially brought back the 
war on the continent almost ten years after the NATO intervention in Kosovo, taking 
on new life nationalistic instances evidently not appeased. The pro-Russian separatist 
administrations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia have been trying to gain formal 
independence from Georgia since breaking away in the early 1990s. Tensions in both 
regions began to escalate after Mikhail Saakashvili was elected Georgian president in 
2004, on a promise to re-unite the country. The conflicts had remained largely frozen, 
despite occasional flare-ups, until August 2008, when a series of clashes between 
 
102The meetings of Annapolis between the Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and the President of the 
stinian Authority Abum Mazen began on November 2007 and dealt, among other questions, with 
ce on February 2009) and 
Pale
the foundation of a Palestinian independent state within the end of the 2008. They were interrupted 
because of the scandal which involved the Israeli Prime Minister. Any discussion was then postponed 
on the 2009 after the Israeli new political elections (which regularly took pla
the deadline of Abu Mazen’s mandate (there’s great uncertainty on whether and when new elections 
will be held in Palestine).       
103  
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Georgian and South Ossetia forces prompted Georgia to launch an aerial 
bombardment and ground attack in South Ossetia. Russia, meanwhile, poured 
thousands of troops into South Ossetia, and launched bombing raids both over the 
province and on targets in the rest of Georgia with the declared intent of defending the 
Russian citizen in the area104. It is unclear if the Russian forces entered South Ossetia 
before or after the Georgian attack. What is certain is the great amount of casualties 
that the conflict caused. Despite limited causalities estimated in some tens105, a lot of 
civilians were driven out of their homes in South Ossetia. Many of them crossed over 
to the Russian republic of North Ossetia. Residents of Georgian villages in South 
Ossetia, and the town of Gori, also fled. The heavy fighting left the South Ossetia 
capital, Tskhinvali, largely in ruins. On 19 August, the UN High Commission for 
refugees estimated in 158.700 the number of persons displaced because of the conflict 
with a peak of 200.000 in the heat of the clashes. 
However, the outbreak of the war was worthy only of turning the Chinese journey of 
President Bush for the Olympics games upside down and to earn Russia the firm as 
much interested condemn of the US for a ‘dangerous escalation’ which, they said, 
threatened to jeopardize the peace of the entire region106. In no way it succeeded in 
pushing the world political community on a common position, neither in showing the 
promptness and effectiveness of the international apparatus of global governance. 
Since the first clashes in South Ossetia, the Security Council convened for a session of 
emergence without that the 15 members could find any agreement on a shared 
declaration of ceasefire. The same irresolution was then replayed during the 
succeeding sessions when the indecisiveness of the member states got mixed with 
Russia and Georgia’s reciprocal accusations of ‘ethnic cleanliness’ leaving no space 
for any possible mediation. The same agreement that Russia and Georgia finally 
achieved by the mediation of the French Prime Minister, Nicolas Sarkozy, President 
on duty of the EU, despite in the short period had the merit to have silenced the 
armies, at the long period do not seem to have posed solid bases for a peaceful and 
lasting solution of the conflict. On the contrary, the relapses of the Georgian crisis 
                                                 
104See. The discourse of the Russian President Medvedev over the recognition of the independence of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia held on 26 August 2008. An English version of the discourse can be found 
on http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/world/europe/27medvedev.html       
105Human Right Watch, Letter to Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili regarding civilian casualty 
figures in South Ossetia, 10 October 2008, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/10/10/letter-georgian-
president-mikheil-saakashvili-regarding-civilian-casualty-figures-so   
106The US are the first Georgia’s ally and hard supporter of its territorial integrity  
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threat to stimulate the persistent instability of the region widening to other zones of 
potential tension of the Caucasus, for instance, to the pro-Russian secessionist 
provinces of Transnistria in Moldavia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. But, the 
question does not limit itself at a domestic or regional level. Nor it is bounded to 
simple nationalistic claims. The slotting of the matter in the more general context of 
the global struggle for energetic resources, poses to the Western countries in primis 
and potentially to the world, wider problems of resource endowments which affect the 
energetic security of these countries and their citizens. Yet, the West expectations 
conflict both with those of the new emerging states and supplier countries, in 
particular with those of Russia which sees in the matter the chance to carve out again 
an international role of high profile. Besides the clash of Russian and American 
strategic and economic interests for the control over raw materials and the routes of 
energy in the Caucasian area, the war in Georgia poses serious political dilemmas and 
questions of international law. In particular, what happened in the Balkans in the 1999 
with the NATO humanitarian intervention in Kosovo has determined the dissolution 
of frozen conflicts with uncertain consequences. According to Ennio Remondino, 
reporter from ex-Yugoslavia during the NATO air raids as well as long-experienced 
specialist of Balkans incidents, the events in Georgia repropose, after those in 
Kosovo, “the ambiguity in the management of the instances of the ethnic and religious 
separatism reappeared after the fall of the wall of Berlin”. With the ‘humanitarian 
interference’ in Yugoslavia, he notes, “Brussels and Washington have replaced the 
ancient rule of the Westphalia peace on the sacredness of the state borders, with the 
unilateral decision of those who have the authority to sustain their will” . As 
consequence, any attempt of the US and EU to brake the Russian pretensions appears 
today and actually configures, the employing of a double standard policy. On the 
other hand, in the 2004, Vladimir Putin had clearly warned the international 
community on acting unilaterally on the question of Kosovo making oversee 
otherwise his intention of proceeding on the same ground in Georgia. With respect to 
this matter, Sabine Freizer has never doubted on the intention of Putin and Medvedev 
to force Brussels to put on the table the question of the status of the Georgian 
separatist republics appealing to the principle of self-determination. Moscow, she 
107
said, intends to apply in Georgia the same diplomatic strategy employed by the 
                                                 
107Gabriele Santoro’s interview to Ennio Remondino, Ennio Remondino:”Con la Georgia è finito 
l’unilateralismo Usa” 10 September 2008, http://gabrielesantoro.blogspot.com/search?q=remondino  
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Westerns to lead Kosovo toward the independence through the 1444 resolution of the 
UN Security Council. The NATO members began posing the question on the table of 
the international debate. It is not by chance, then, if the French plane explicitly 
provides for “the opening of international discussions on the way to reach security and 
stability in Abkhazia and South Ossetia” . In front of the UN inactivity and the US 
impossibility to mediate in a conflict in which they are an interested part, it would be 
up to Europe to use its neutrality to bring back peace in a country that allows oil to 
pass from the Caspian to the old continent b
108
ypassing Russia. Yet, the record marked 
                                                
by the happenings in Kosovo, in which the European member states of NATO are 
directly implicated along with the US, reduce the chances of the EU for a credible 
action. More decisively, any hope placed on the EU is further frustrated by the 
divisions that go across the 27 members about the nature of the relations with 
Moscow. On one side, Great Britain, Sweden, Poland, and the Baltic countries, well-
known for their aversion to Russia, claim for firmness against the Russian federation. 
On the opposite side, France, Italy, and Germany are more inclined to dialogue, at 
least to avoid an head-on collision with a country considered strategic on the energetic 
ground. In the meantime, while the world is waiting for the moves of the new US 
administration on the matter, Washington and Moscow have strengthen their 
respective military alliances in the area, letting easily to prefigure the sensation of a 
nostalgic return to a logic of contraposition. 
In a Working Document for the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Andrey 
S. Makarychev argued that “[o]ne of the most important effects of Russia’s war 
against Georgia in August 2008 was a new set of approaches to the future of European 
security being actively promoted by Dmitry Medvedev and the Foreign Minister 
Sergey Lavrov.”109 In a clear distinction from the European ‘normative’ perspective, 
he continued, the Russian standpoint towards international society is characterized by 
a more enhanced ‘decisionist’ trait. On one side, “the EU seems to give priority to the 
‘thick’ version of international society, with a clear emphasis on normativism” and 
“the central importance of an autonomous legal order for constraining the arbitrary 
and personal exercise of political power”. On the other side, “the Russian stance is a 
bit more ambiguous: it appears to be "more systemic rather normative", [waving 
 
108For a general account of the Georgia peace plan see Charles Bremner, Full text of the Georgia peace 
plan - and obstacles to its implementation, Moscow, Times Online, 13 August 2008, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4522496.ece  
109Andrey S. Makarychev, Russia and its ’New Security Architecture’ in Europe: A Critical 
Examination of the Concept, CEPS Working Document No. 310, February 2009, p.1   
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between] ‘sovereignist’, ‘exceptionalist’, or ‘nationalist’” conceptions and “an 
‘internationalist reading”. At the same time, he added, while the EU is ‘by-large-a-
hitecture from part of Russia takes the stance from a 
                                                
supporter’ of an ‘unitary model’ of international society and argues in favor of 
“homogenous rules of the game for all state actors”, Russia ‘sympathizes’ with a 
‘pluralist’ schema and “the multiplicity of political singularities potentially clashing 
with each other.” What is particularly noteworthy here is that, according to 
Makarychev’s suggestion, the latest developments, including the August 2008 war 
against Georgia, apparently moved Russia further away from the European 
understanding of international society to what might be presumably dubbed the 
formation of a “political subject which is absolutely free” from international 
commitments and thus insensitive to external pressures, including normative ones. In 
line with this position, “one of the key messages conveyed by the Kremlin in autumn 
2008, was meant to question the primordial importance of cooperating with such 
institutions as NATO, G8 and WTO.”110  
This search for a new security arc
severe critique of the existing security institutions. Perhaps the most noticeable logical 
problem looming large at this juncture”, Makarychev noticed, “is that the Kremlins 
tends to find the roots of the current imperfections in international security in both 
‘block approaches’ and ‘unipolarity’.”111 Yet,   despite it is clear that Russia objects to 
the unipolar US-led world model its current foreign policy discourse and action offer 
no clear guidance as to what its aims are in this regards. In his view, these confusions 
and contradictions which affects the Russian international subjectivity are the product 
of deeper and wider “ontological dislocations” that make the Russian identity 
“unstable, divided, split and unfixed.” As consequence, Russia’s present international 
stance is “a mixture of Realpolitik pragmatism” and “liberal assumptions”, 
“institutional commitments” and “reluctant unilateralism”, “particularist assumptions” 
and “universal explanations”.112  
Although, this situation doesn’t allow for a credible prediction of neither what will be 
the further-steps of Russia’s international policy nor the direction it will take. 
However, a guide principle results evident from Makarychev’s analysis of Russia’s 
international action. This principle is made explicit in a strong commitment toward 
 
110Ibid., pp. 4-5 
111Ibid. p.1; see also, Dmitry Medvedev’s speech at the World Policy Conference, Evian, 8 October 
2008, http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/10/207422.shtml  
112Ibid. pp. 3-4 
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state sovereignty and power state decisionism. As matter of fact, although “it is 
normative credentials that to a significant extent legitimise Russia’s eagerness to be 
part of the international society,” acting within the “normative/solidarist logic” or a 
“cosmopolitan” asset based on the “supernational rule of law”, Russia displays a 
number of contradictions. Within this predominantly normative logic, Russia is in fact 
supposed to keep integrating in the existing IS structures, however unfair or imperfect 
they might be. In this sense, normative judgments were one of Russia’s major 
arguments against the Saakashvili regime in Georgia, Ukraine’s NATO membership 
and the disenfranchisement of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic countries, 
etc. Similarly on this line, Russia tries to convince the international society states that 
it is democracy that Russia seeks in the international arena, even if this type of 
democracy is “reduced to the mere plurality of strong states under the guise of 
‘multipolarity’.” But, in August 2008 the Kremlin implicitly accepted the US foreign 
policy philosophy it otherwise lambasted, which gave Russia a chance “not only to 
confirm its belonging to a ‘normal’ group of countries but – what is of primordial 
importance – to claim the power to ‘normalise’ (‘discipline and punish’, to put in a 
Foucauldian way) those who are portrayed as ‘virtual’ (i.e. being subject to external 
manipulation) governments allegedly deviating from international standards and 
causing large-scale security problems.” In second place, Russia is more a norm-
exploiter than a norm-producer. According to Makarychev’s own words, “it stays far-
removed from multiple norm-producing initiatives on a trans-national scale, including 
– but not limited to – norms that regulate transparency, accountability, sustainable 
development, good governance, and so on.” Finally, another point of contention 
relates to the way in which ‘security’ is understood within this normative/solidarist 
framework. Through several ‘word games’ the Russian leaders attached to the concept 
of world security an “unnatural number of adjectives[…], as if to fill the ‘empty 
signifier’ with as many as possible”. Furthermore, they characterized “the novel 
‘security architecture’ as both ‘space’ and ‘system’”, and misinterpreted the idea of 
‘human security’, intentionally confusing it with the ‘responsibility to protect’.113 To 
be true, the IS type that seems to be more desirable to Russia is “a model of 
international society grounded in the ability of sovereign powers to take political 
decisions of their own”. Medvedev all too easily drops the language of multilateralism 
in favor of unilateral decisionism: “As far as our military contingent [in South 
                                                 
113Ibid. pp.6-8 
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Ossetia] is concerned, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that not a single 
document, including our joint plan with President Sarkozy, previsions that this 
contingent would abide by any rules […] It is up to us to define what troops we need 
there, where they will be based and what kind of military bases will be deployed over 
there”. What is more, Russian government sometimes incites other governments to act 
within the logic of sovereign decisions. “We expected that the US administration 
would intervene in the [Georgian- South Ossetian] conflict and stop the aggressive 
intentions of the Georgian leadership”, said Prime Minister Putin. Medvedev’s 
multiple suggestions that the Western countries need to be pragmatic and guided by 
their “genuine interests” (presumably comprehended by the Russian President better), 
as opposed to “imagined ideological clichés”, also fit, by and large, the decisionist, 
rather than normative, foreign policy philosophy114. Russia also displayed a similar 
conduct in case of the collision of two different norms of international law. This may 
be illustrated, for example, by the Kosovo debates when Putin implicitly argued that 
in a situation of open conflict between two constitutive principles of international law 
 territorial integrity and the right of self-determination – Russia supports the first 
rom Soviet strategy in the times of 
colonialism. Although, in the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia reversed 
its pref
                                                
–
principle and repudiates the second as a left-over f
erences. According to Makarychev, these kinds of example show us how “two 
competing norms open [to Russia] new possibilities for a political type of behaviour 
based upon sovereign political wills, which might either provoke antagonisms or lead 
to political negotiations.” This means in his view that “the existing international 
structures do not automatically define which of the two competing norms has to be 
enacted, and the decision to choose one is always political in the strict sense – i.e. it 
has to be based rather upon sovereign will than determined by structural 
circumstances”115.  
 
b) Economic anxieties: nationalism, protectionism 
 
Although probably defective, the previous depiction clearly shows that the 
today’s world crisis takes the shape of a political emergency which touches in the first 
 
114Ibid. pp.8-9; see also, Dmitry Medvedev’s interview with BBC, Sochi, 26 August 2008, 
http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/08/205775.shtml, and, Vladimir Putin’s interview with CNN, 
Sochi, 28 August 2008, http://www.government.ru    
115Ibid. p.10 
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place the global concern for security. Yet, reasons of apprehension are not confined 
strictly to this domain and they are interlaced with strong economic anxieties. The 
latter encompasses, for example, the well-known puzzles posed by the world poverty 
which closely links to that of world migrations, the new pressure exercised on the 
global economic asset by powerful emerging markets, and the quoted frictions 
y a wide-ranging 
marking the competition for energetic supplying.  
But more shockingly, the overall ‘Economic Crisis’, in which we are all currently 
involved, throws the world citizens into the prospective of an uncertain future and 
calls the states to face a breakdown that, as generally recognized, threats to be harsher 
than the 1929 Great Depression. The disaster announced itself b
financial collapse which has involved huge private companies and banks and has put 
in crisis the public management of several states along with the domestic 
administration of millions of world citizens. Finally, the feared shift of the crisis from 
the financial sector to the real economy has become substantial, pushing the markets 
from East to West into a generalized climate of distrust and making concrete the 
phantom of the global recession.  
This general slump obliges the states to engage in a deep and hard second thoughts 
concerning if not the capitalistic method of economic development in itself, its 
procedures, regulations and finalities. The overcoming of this impasse affects the 
future perspectives of the Western states, the further step forward of the developing 
countries and the often forgotten needs of the Third World nations.  
Despite these hard premises the official political statements seem to suggest an 
international mood of cooperation fed by a shared consciousness that the spread of the 
current economic turmoil needs a coordinated global response. Aiming to this goal, 
more than 20 of the world's leaders gathered at the White House on 14 November 
2008 for a two-day emergency summit on the global crisis situation. But, even as 
participants began to assemble in what is the largest collection of presidents and prime 
ministers in almost a decade, doubts are raised that it had achieved anything beyond 
general declarations of principle to stimulate the world economy and an agreement to 
meet again. The fact that the gathering brings together representatives of about 85% 
of the world's economy has prompted inevitable comparisons to the 1944 Bretton 
Woods meeting when 44 countries assembled in New Hampshire to devise the 
postwar international monetary system. But many analysts believe that ‘Bretton 
Woods II’ will resemble its predecessor only in the scale of the crisis. “I'm confident 
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that not much concrete action will come out of it,” said Brad Setser, a former US 
Treasury official and expert on geo-economics at the Council on Foreign Relations. In 
fact, the disparate nature of the world countries brings potential problems. Bush, 
k. “There are very different points of view about what should be done, 
by the candidate Obama on the primaries circuit. Yet, his $787 billion stimulus 
before leaving his office, has made it clear that while the US may favor greater 
regulation, it should be handled at the national rather than international level. China, 
too, has shown little desire to see new global systems reduce its control over its own 
exchange rate. “The Chinese exchange rate is fundamentally undervalued, but the 
Chinese government sees that as a matter of its own sovereignty,” said Setser116. 
Similarly, the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown acknowledged disputes over 
how, and how fast, to reform international financial institutions such as the IMF and 
World Ban
different interests represented here, different policy positions,” he declared117.  
Furthermore, large international attention is obviously paid to the moves of the US as 
leading country of the world economy. Some experts believe that this crisis will sound 
the end of the US world dominant superpower. On the contrary, others sustain that the 
current turmoil will strengthen the relative position of the US and expose its 
competitors to the graver weakness118. Yet, there’s no doubt that the economic 
choices of the US government will affect grandly the chances and the timing of the 
world crisis overcoming and will influence, in some way, the plans of the other 
countries.  
In the context of the liberal consensus, great hopes for the employing of a multilateral 
approach to the economic crisis are placed on the president-elect Obama. This 
optimistic expectations have been kept despite prudential protectionist talks expressed 
plan119 signed into law on 17 February 2009 and, more generally, the international 
implications of  his economic policy have raised concerns on the scope of his 
multilateral commitment. In this sense, Jagdish Bhagwati sounded an alarm well 
before the approval of the US economic plan. He noticed the “eloquent silence” of the 
                                                 
116Cited in Ed Pilkington, Doubts raised over prospects of success for 'hasty summit', The Guardian, 
NY, 15 November 2008, (my c.ve), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/nov/15/economics-
global-economy 
117Cited in Ed Pilkington and Mark Tran, Gordon Brown heralds progress at G20 financial crisis talks, 
The Guardian, NY, 15 November 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/nov/15/economics-
globaleconomy1 
118See for example, Osvald Spengler, Obama, an economic unilateralist, Asia Times Online, February, 
18, 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/KB18Dj05.html    
119A PDF version of the final text of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act is available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/arra_public_review/  
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President Obama “on trade issues – and his failure to balance his protectionist 
appointments with powerful trade proponents. Mr. Obama,” he explained “missed the 
opportunity, provided by the Group of 20’s affirmation of trade’s importance, to 
affirm that he attaches the highest priority to closing the Doha round120 and will work 
on this urgent task throughout his first year. More important,” Bhagwati continued, 
“Mr. Obama has missed the bus on preventing a slide back into protectionism.” In 
particular, “his pronouncements on the car bail-out disregard the lessons of the early 
1930s”. Similarly, the actual employment of government loans for auto recovery can 
be qualified as “countervailing action and dispute settlement challenges” inconsistent 
with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which merged in 1995 into the 
World Trade Organization. As predicted by Bhagwati, similar measures have been 
then adopted all over the world, at least indirectly, in response to the US economic 
interventions. From Argentina and Brazil to Russia, China and Japan as far as to 
Australia, all these countries have planned some form of public aid for the auto 
recovery. On the contrary in Europe, the EU is seemed incapable to provide for a 
common ground of norms for supporting the European car industry in general. France, 
Spain, Germany, Great Britain, Sweden and Portugal have then implemented 
singularly their own plans to sustain their own national farms. These measures have 
raised complains, particularly pressing in Italy, and worries within the same European 
institutions for what could be configured as unlawful protectionism and disloyal 
competition among the state members. Properly concerning the matter, the Ministry 
for the European industry, Guenter Verheugen, had convened the 27 EU ministries on 
16 January 2009 finally giving the go-ahead to a coordinated plan of European 
intervention in favor of the car-sector. Yet, the declension of these aids at the 
                                                 
120The Doha Development Round is the current trade-negotiation round of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) which commenced in November 2001. Its objective is to lower trade barriers 
around the world, which allows c untries to increase o
on major issues, such as agriculture, industrial tariffs and non-tariff barriers, services, and trade 
remedies. The most significant differences are between developed nations led by the European Union, 
 in Geneva, (2004, 2006, 2008); Paris, (2005); 
 mostly between US, China, and 
trade globally. Yet, state partecipants are divided 
the United States, and Japan and the major developing countries led and represented mainly by India, 
Brazil, China, and South Africa. There is also considerable contention against and between the EU and 
the U.S. over their maintenance of agricultural subsidies. The Doha Round began with a ministerial-
level meeting in Doha, Qatar in 2001. Subsequent ministerial meetings took place in Cancún, (2003), 
and Hong Kong (2005). Related negotiations took place
and Potsdam, (2007). The most recent round of negotiations, July 23-29 2008, broke down after failing 
to reach a compromise on agricultural import rules. After the break down, major negotiations were not 
expected to resume until 2009. Nevertheless, intense negotiations,
India, were held in the end of 2008 in order to agree on negotiation modalities. However, these 
negotiations did not result in any progress. For an official account of Doha Rounds see.  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm  
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domestic level certainly will not quite the quarrel and the European seal on the public 
lifebelt for the car farms will not impede to the state members to act, once more, 
separately. “In short, what has to be saved today is not only the European car-sector 
but the holding stability of the common Market.”121 Looking through the question and 
beyond the appearance, the international atmosphere is not then that of an harmonious 
concert of cooperative states. On the contrary, “protectionism, or the de-globalization, 
as the scholars of Davos122 define it, is scarping back again.” This is certainly 
“testified by the American temptations to make campaign for the "buy American"” 
But, not only the states tend to writhe within. More impressively, we are assisting to 
“the people retreating on themselves.” The economic crisis, in fact, pushes individuals 
toward “forms of short-sighted nationalism” that drives them “to ask to their own 
governments for protection from foreigners.” This uneasy has recently flowed into 
social disorders which, “after Greece, France and Russia, […] have reached the Great 
Britain with a series of manifestations all over the country from part of English 
workers asking for "British job for British workers" against the employment of Italian 
manpower.” It’s particularly surprising and significant as well that  “Great Britain, 
always supporter of free trade, […] it is now so much disturbed by the competition on 
its own labor market after times of openness and wide-spread well-being”123. These 
uproars stand to remember us resolutely that behind the economic crisis with its 
indexes, rates, ranks, flows, parameters, and previsions, there are people and their 
miseries. “Since it began, 3.6 million people have lost their job in the United States,” 
the White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs declared on 6 February 2009. Some 
emerging countries will see their developing rank brusquely decreasing, “a break 
                                                 
121Adriana Cerretelli, Auto, Bruxelles apre il dossier aiuti, il Sole24ore, 16 January 2009, (my tran.),  
http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/SoleOnLine4/Economia%20e%20Lavoro/2009/01/auto-bruxelles-apre-
dossier-aiuti.shtml?uuid=23e9d4ee-e39e-11dd-8bb2-8e7c532a6d51  
122In 1971 Davos began hosting the World Economic Forum, an annual winter gathering centered 
around discussions of the world’s leading economic, political, and social concerns. Scholars of 
globalization have used the term “Davos culture” to represent the elite group of international business, 
political, and civil-society leaders who attend the annual meeting. Its five-day 2009 meeting that taken 
place from 28 January attracted over 2500 participants from 91 countries, including over 1170 CEOs 
and chairpersons from the world's most powerful companies. Others included 219 public figures, 40 
heads of state, 64 cabinet ministers, and various other high-level business, government, think tank, 
media, academic, religious, organizational, and union officials. Noticeably different, according to 
Bloomberg, "was the virtual absence of Wall Street figures" as well as top Obama administration 
figures, James Hertling and Simon Kennedy, ‘Grimmest’ Davos Ever Brings Anger, Finger-Pointing at 
Bankers, 2 February 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aSrfvUUeboBM&refer=home   
123Marco Niada, E' cominciata la de-globalizzazione: allacciate le cinture, 02 February 2009, (my 
trans.) http://marconiada.blog.ilsole24ore.com/2009/02/e-cominciata-la-deglobalizzazione-allacciate-
le-cinture.html#more 
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which will be caught not only as a simple breaking but as real recession” and that 
already caused to 20 millions of Chinese workers the lost of their jobs (almost the 
entire amount of the Italian labor). The World Bank President, Robert Zoellick 
announced, moreover, that the actual financial crisis will provoke an increase in the 
ecretary-general, Ban Ki-moon has warned in an open letter to the Washington 
is thesis mainly focused on accounts of international relations 
amount of  people suffering from malnutrition of 44 millions of unity124. The UN 
s
summit participants that a human tragedy could unfold. “If hundreds of millions of 
people lose their livelihoods and their hopes for the future are dashed because of a 
crisis they have absolutely no responsibility for, the human crisis will not remain just 
economic,”125 he wrote. What is on play here is not only the sustainability of certain 
life stiles but, more decisively, entire individual and collective life projects.    
 
 
2.4.   Cosmopolitan Democracy and the question of inclusion and exclusion 
 
Before coming to the solutions proposed by the supporters of Cosmopolitan 
Democracy to address the problem of the global deficit of democracy, and to their 
alternative model of world governance, we have to clarify the main presumptions on 
which this approach is based. In particular, the attention is here put on its 
conceptualization of the relationship between the internal and external domain. In this 
respect, Part 1. of th
which share the basic assumption of the state as an autonomous and isolated political 
entity. Yet, it has to be noted that this is no more than a theoretical fiction, a 
simplification useful for building a political theory, but far from a realistic 
representation of what effectively took place in the course of history. In fact, no state 
can be rightly regarded as really and completely independent from external 
influences. The political communities have always reciprocally affected their lives, 
either though war and trade, or for diplomatic interests, religious reasons or simple 
desire of knowledge. In this sense, they all have been  intrinsically moulded by 
external influences.  
                                                 
124See. Robert Zoellick press conference at Washington on 9 October 2008. Some transcriptions of the 
conference and a video about the potential human crisis spreading out from the current Economic 
Crisis are available at http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/unifeed/detail/10355.html  
125Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General's letter to the G20 Summit, 12 November 2008, 
ov08.htmhttp://www.unicwash.org/news/sg_letter12n    
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From the ancient era to current times the channels of contact have increased with the 
strengthening of trade relations, the improvement of technics, the expansion of 
tourism, the development of mass-communications, the enhancing of migrations and 
so forth. Nowadays, these forms of external intrusion have terrifically increased in 
quantity and quality with the rise of the process of globalization. With respect to this 
phenomenon, in a recent work Archibugi argued that “while the traditional dichotomy 
internal/external assumes the existence of a clear distinction between the two areas, 
these dimensions become even more connected”. Thereby, the field for the 
autonomous decision of the state grows every day thinner126.    
  
ent of power. 
                                                
This is a problem which concerns all states independently from the nature of their 
internal regimes, either whether they are democratic or autocratic. In this sense, if on 
one side, the authoritarian regimes perceives the globalization as a threat since it 
undermines their control on the population. On the other side, the democratic states 
are put under pressure since the globalization ask them to answer to questions which 
are often placed outside of their capacity of resolution. With respect to such pressures, 
in the previous chapter we have described how much is actual the risk of a closure of 
the states, even democratic, toward the internal domain in favor of nationalistic, 
ethnocentric and protectionist positions. At the same time, in the same analysis, we 
showed also how much concrete is the possibility that such states respond violently to 
these puzzles.
As Kant already noted, while internally the peaceful coexistence of individuals is 
granted by the stipulation of the social contract, at the extra-borders level, a similar 
international social contract is still to be established. Till its codification, it is thus not 
at all granted that the states, and crucially those democratic, will act according to non-
violent means in their relations with the extern. The question of finding a peaceful 
asset of international relations is further exacerbated since, as said, the interstate 
system has a direct and decisive influence on the domestic managem
This means that, “the chance that a state has to become democratic or reinforce its 
democracy is directly tied to the existing international climate, because the absence of 
a peaceful climate cuts off the dissent, mortifies the oppositions, limits the internal 
freedom”127. 
 
, p.67 (my trans.) 126Archibugi, footnote n.6
127Ibid., p.71 (my trans.) 
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In reason of this reading of the relationship between the domestic and international 
realm, Cosmopolitan Democracy draws a strong correlations between the 
international peace and the internal democratization. However, this nexus has not to 
be intended in absolute terms. In this sense, the absence of interstate conflicts may 
well allow the autocratic regimes to consolidate their domestic power. Yet, the link 
between the two spheres “become explicit in its negative version: the absence of 
peace, that is a latent or manifest conflictuality, thwarts democracy”128. 
In the chapters in Part 1., we have illustrated how Kant and the liberal 
internationalism have tried to solve the problem of the international system basing on 
the presumption of the popular control of the government. This would have allowed 
the democratic non-violent presumptions to spread across the borders. Yet, Archibugi 
argued, the historical accounts and the statistical data on wars, partially deny the 
liberal assumptions. First, a war is not always in contrast with the interests of the state 
and its people, in particular when the costs are limited and the benefits high and 
generally distributed. As crucially the rise of Nazis and Fascists have taught, the real 
situation is not even to be really  advantageous but it suffices to make it so felt. In this 
cases, a sort of alliance come on place between the public opinion and the state-rulers. 
Secondly, the amount of wars fought by democracies is almost equal to the numbers 
of conflicts engaging autocracies129.           
On the basis of this evidences, the liberal international doctrine has reduced its claims 
sustaining more simply that two democracies usually do not fight against each other. 
This is the hypothesis stated by the already quoted ‘Democratic Peace’ thesis. In light 
of this thought, it would be possible to reach at the international level at least a 
separated peace among democratic regimes. This peace would be ultimately based on 
the reciprocal recognition that those countries grant to each other and, consequently, 
the war ascribed to the lack of reciprocity between democratic and authoritarian 
states. This theory seems to be more reasonable than its previous version, since it 
appears plausible that two states that share a certain degree of affinity and 
acknowledge this resemblance will be less inclined to wage war against each other. 
Nevertheless, this do not saved it from some decisive defects. As Archibugi noted, 
first of all, it is well-known that the states give their recognition to other states not 
                                                 
128Ibid., p.74 (my trans.) 
129Ibid., p.75. See also, Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, “The Monadic Democratic Puzzle 
and an ‘End of History‘ Partial Solution?”, in International Politics, Palgrave Macmillan, Vol. 40, No. 
1, 2003, pp. 5-27, cit in ibid., p.75 
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always for the high value of the war peace, but, more often, for reasons of  economic, 
political or strategic interest. The democratic regimes are not exempt from this logic. 
The admission to the democratic club it has been bestowed few times with 
transparency, clearness and in an univocal manner and, more frequently, with interests 
more or less hidden or evident. Thus, relying too much upon the idea of the reciprocal 
recognition seems to be a too wide indulgence toward idealism. A second weakness 
stands in the fact that “the political systems are taken into account according to a 
dichotomic variable (democratic/autocratic), without considering the existing 
difference between their own historical evolution”. This has brought to the extension 
                                                
of the concept to varied epochs and circumstances and to the comparison of really 
different political arrangements. Yet, each state has followed is particular path of 
political evolution and even the democratic regimes have developed with distinctive 
features which still nowadays subsist. It is thus difficult when not misleading to 
compare such diverse realities. Finally, the democratic peace thesis may and 
sometimes has actually suggested that it would be simply necessary to force all the 
states to be democratic to obtain a peaceful world order. In this sense, Archibugi said, 
Norberto Bobbio has further extended the point beyond the war-case to encompass 
“the entire relationship between interstate system on one side and internal regimes, on 
the other side” with the extended implication that “if all states were democratic, even 
the interstate system would be democratic”130. The most recent failures of the Bush’s 
doctrine are only the last example of how much disastrous can be the concrete 
implementation of such theoretical inferences.   
Contrary to this approach, the advocates of Cosmopolitan Democracy do not believe 
that a strong and fixed relation exists between domestic and international system. The 
reason of this lack of congruence must be identified “in the fact that the democratic 
countries are too often reluctant to apply even in the foreign policy the principles and 
values which constitute the internal system”. At the same time, the state members of 
the current international system enjoy a pact of non-aggression and the recognition of 
a formal equality. But, because of the democratic deficit which, as we have seen, 
affects the international scenario, the individuals which internally are granted with the 
same pact, outside the borders are in no way allowed to participate to the process of 
decision-making. They are thus regarded no more as citizens but as mere subjects131. 
 
130Archibugi, footnote n.6, pp.80-83 
131Ibid., p.84 
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In other words, the congruence of the two sphere remains conditioned by the 
appliance at the international level of a principle of conduct congruent with that used 
domestically. This implies both the coherent respect of a full developed democratic 
transnational system  and the opening of a space for the representation of individuals.  
he breaking of the link between internal and external sphere brings the approach of 
osmopolitan Democracy to a further consideration. In this sense, Archibugi 
 to the international sphere. Rather, they extend to touch the 
ame very nature of the democratic regimes. In this sense, every time they commit an 
e same time, it is essential to correct the “normative 
certainly at the top of the state agenda. In particular the US and Russia have showed 
ferent intent. In this respect, in “Does the Constitutionalization 
T
C
revealed, the implications of the question of how democracies behave in their external 
relations are not limited
s
abuse, even at the expense of an authoritarian state, they distort their essence because 
they violate their constitutive pact. It is thus necessary to conceptualize a system of 
pacific coexistence between states with different kinds of regimes, which has to be 
able to urge the autocratic states to change their system without turn to the unlawful 
use of the military violence. At th
error” committed by the Democratic Peace theorists and thus no more confronting 
democratic and autocratic states, but rather the adherence of the foreign policy of 
democracies with their domestic conduct132.   
 
 
2.5. The project  of Cosmopolitan Democracy: interrelated levels of governance and 
the  world constitution 
 
We have seen in the previous chapter that the Cosmopolitan Democracy gives an 
answer to the basic question of inclusion and exclusion which decisively resolves in 
favor of the democratization of the international apparatus. We will study now how 
Cosmopolitan Democracy has effectively turned this “imaginative effort”133 into a 
concrete system of governance.  
Looking to the account developed in 2.2. of the current most striking puzzles of the 
world situation, the extension of democracy at the international level doesn’t seem 
until now to have a dif
                                                 
132Ibid. p.85-86 
133Archibugi, footnote n.2 
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of International Law Still Have a Chance?”,134 Habermas analyzed Immanuel Kant’s 
famous idealistic conceptions of a ‘cosmopolitan condition’ supporting a 
‘cosmopolitan constitution’. Then, he contrasted Kant’s classical universalist project 
of a ‘world republic’ and its lesser surrogate, a ‘federalism of free states’, with two 
other more recent projects - a U.S.-imposed (moralist) unipolar global order of 
hegemonic liberalism on the one hand, and Carl Schmitt’s (realist) pluripolar 
toward former Soviet republics. Habermas’s sympathies are clearly 
ion being covered by this process of 
y” where future democratic 
antagonism (and volatile balance) of a small number of imperial powers, each of them 
hegemonizing a hemisphere,135 on the other hand.136 Whereas the ‘Bush approach’ 
has seriously divided the West, the ‘Schmitt approach’ seems to be at the heart of 
Russia’s policy 
with Kant,137 and so are those of the supporters of Cosmopolitan Democracy. In 
contrast with the US and Russian models, the idea of Cosmopolitan Democracy is 
thus to spread democracy outside the borders revitalizing the Kantian schema. This 
means to endorse that all levels of human interact
democratization. At the same time, this suggests to rely upon a new international 
constitutionalism, granting the correct accomplishment of this task according to its 
inspiring democratic principles.      
In this sense, Archibugi takes into account five “paradigmatic dimensions”: local 
field, state realm, interstate domain, regional area and global sphere138, which 
correspond to what Michael Mann has defined as “the socio-spatial nets of social 
interaction”139.  
At the local level, his project of Cosmopolitan Democracy pushes for the 
strengthening of the structure of the local government, particularly where the 
problems concern portions of different states. This would allow a more direct 
representation of the interests of the individuals.  
The role of the state in the global context is instead conceptualized in a two-fold 
fashion. On one side, it is considered the “laborator
provisions are firstly conceptualized and put in practice. In this sense, as already 
                                                 
134Habermas, footnote n.54, p.115    
135Carl Smith,  
136Habermas mentions two further counter-models to the Kantian vision (the neoliberal model of a 
global market society beyond the state and the post-Marxist scenario of a dispersed empire without a 
power center) but ultimately considers them as unrealistic., see footnote n.125 p.185   
137 See. Habermas, footnote n.54, p.179 
138Archibugi, footnote n. 6, pp. 98-104 
139Michel Mann, ‘Has the Globalization Ended the Rise of the Nation-State?’, in Review of 
International Political Economy, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1997, pp. 472-496, cit. in Archibugi, footnote n. 117, p. 
98   
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quoted above, within some democratic states it is currently opened the discussion on 
the further extension of the rights of citizenship (crucially the political rights) to 
certain categories of foreigners (those who regularly paid taxes and stably lived on the 
territory). This can constitute the premise for a wider debate on the opportunity of the 
institutionalization of the “cosmopolitan citizenship” which would allow the 
international community to meet the need of rights for which refugees, homeless and 
migrants in general are suffering in the global arena. On the other side, the state can 
be the “agent” of the process of international democratization. Yet, taking this role 
means not only embracing a virtuous foreign policy but, fundamentally it implies the 
will to respect a set of shared international procedures.  
The interstate dimension is the one which is particularly affected by the ‘democratic 
deficit’. Indeed, there is often no guarantee that the interstate organizations will take 
their decisions respecting the will of the majority of the interest-holders. Such 
organizations are in fact exclusively composed of states which are assembled 
l the traditional principles of democracy, as 
foundation of East African Community. 
according to the principle of their formal equality. This implies that each member-
state is granted with one vote independently from the amount of its population, the 
level of its political or military strength, and the degree of its involvement in the 
matter at sake. This is, for example, the system of decision-making of the General 
Assembly of the UN. But, analogously, in the Security Council, the right of veto of 
the five permanent-members violates al
similarly do, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund assigning 
decisional power exclusively on the base of the state’s wealth. At the same time, the 
participation of the individuals in the choices of the interstate organizations is 
extremely limited. Only the European Union has a Parliament, and no other interstate 
organizations provide for mechanisms to involve the individuals in the choice of the 
most proper solution for the problems at discussion. Moreover, although it is 
increasing the involvement of the Non-Governmental Organizations in the interstate 
structure, till their contribution remains only advisory.           
The regional domain is seen as a possible factor of great stability, particularly in those 
areas where the state institution laid upon varied archaic communities as villages, 
tribes, or ethnic groups. In this sense, although the European Union represents the 
most relevant historical case of such kind of arrangement, the regional organizations 
have spread, above all for trade goals, even, for example, in Africa with the 
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Finally, the idea of extending the democratic principles at the global level starts from 
the presumption of the existence of a global governance. The actual form of this 
governance, as we have illustrated, is imperfect because both fails its goals and lack 
of any accountability. In this respect, the project of Cosmopolitan Democracy wants 
to give voice to the individuals independently from the decisional power they possess 
within their own respective states. Furthermore, in the most recent times, new and old 
actors are emerged on the global scenario. All these political subjects nowadays have 
got incomparable means to express their opinion and not necessarily this is 
represented by their territorial state-government. In other words, Archibugi sentenced, 
“a transnational active participation is developing, often associated with new forms of 
organization of the interests”140. The increasing desire of participation to the global 
rnmental organizations are in 
me time, its conceptualization 
institutions, at any level, to rules, checks and balances.  
  
matters gets expressed not just passively in an increasing number of non-
governmental organizations. More concretely, it has got substance in the rising 
importance acquired by the so-called ‘global movements’ which, since their coming 
on the scene at the 1999 Seattle WTO Conference, are a constant presence of all the 
most important international event. Yet, these movements rise a fundamental problem 
of democratic legitimation. If on one side, the global movements are lacking of any 
political mandate and thus are deprived of any legitimate right of representation. On 
the other side, the decisional structures of the non-gove
the hands of narrow groups which are not necessarily accountable to the public 
opinion. As consequence, Archibugi concluded, “it is not enough to evoke the 
existence of varied interest-holders”, first because it is necessary to define their 
“relative weight”, secondly because “there is no guarantee that they will come to 
results more consistent with the general interests”141.       
In the end, then, the proposal of Cosmopolitan Democracy of involving the interests-
holders in the decisional processes, rises crucial questions linked to the puzzles of 
who, how, and how much should be consulted. At the sa
of the question of government as shared among autonomous but interrelated levels of 
management has to face the problem of the possible conflicts of competences. The 
answer of Cosmopolitan Democracy to these puzzles stands in the substitution of the 
principle of sovereignty with a new global constitutionalism aimed at linking all 
                                               
140Archibugi, footnote n.6, p.88 
141Ibid., p.92 
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In this respect, Habermas has emphasized three normative innovations which already 
allegedly endow the UN Charter, in contrast to the Covenant of the League of 
ations, with prima facie features of a constitution.142 These three innovations are the 
xplicit connection of the purpose of securing peace with politics of human rights; the 
he prohibition of the use of force with a realistic threat of criminal 
rosecution and sanctions; the inclusive character of the world organization and the 
univers
 
 
Conclusi
 
In ective”145, a 
favorite  to achieve 
the most  In this respect, he wishes that a philosophical 
istorian might undertake to give us a history of humanity from this point of view. At 
itical democracy has two components: the first one 
N
e
linkage of t
p
al validity it claims for the law it enacts. What it is here on question then is the 
further implementation of an already on-going process. 
At this propos, the idea that the sovereignty is a dogma at has to be overcome143 is 
founded on the presumption that “democracy is incompatible with the presence of a 
political or institutional subject which is not accountable for its actions”. While, the 
assumption that the global conflicts may be solved according to constitutional and 
juridical procedures is rooted in the conviction that “the norms can be respected even 
without a coercive power of last instance”144.    
on 
 “Idea for a Universal History form a Cosmopolitan Persp
concept of Kant is that the ultimate purpose of the human race is
 perfect civic constitution.
h
the same, Kant says, he should show to what extent humanity in various ages has 
approached or indeed drawn away from this final purpose and what remains to be 
done in order to reach it. In a ideal parallelism Archibugi similarly stated referring to 
what he calls a “cosmopolitical democracy”, that, 
 
The project of cosmopol
is more properly analytical, and it is devoted to appraise the state of health 
of democratic systems in front of the challenges of globalization. The 
                                                 
142Habermas, footnote 54, p.160. 
143Hans Kelsen, Il problema della sovranità e la teoria del diritto internazionale, Giuffrè, Milano, 
gs, 2nd ed., ed. Hans Reiss, translated by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
(1920) 1999. 
144Archibugi, footnote n.2, pp.105-106 
145Immanuel Kant., ‘Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective’, in Kant’s Political 
Writin
1991 
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second component is instead essentially normative, and questions itself on 
how democratic systems should change to preserve their own nature in a 
world in which the interactions among states have become so 
remarkable.146 
 
In an inexplicit manner, this thesis has followed the remarks of these authors in the 
analysis of how the basic political question of inclusion and exclusion has been faced 
in the context of the government of international relations. Thus, first, we described  
                           
the most significant moments of a run which is characterized by the constant increase 
in the mechanisms of political inclusion. Then, we account a model for the full 
realization of this tendency.  
On the first point, Kant, drawing his view of the progress of humankind toward its 
final destination, already suggested that the very idea of this concept necessarily 
implies the problem of determining an objective measure of this evolution. But, in his 
analysis, we constantly attend to an endless tending of the political toward the moral 
so that the political community will never completely meet its moral ideal. However, 
the general design of nature is revealed in occasional “moments of the instant” which 
a careful observer can detect to verify the adherence of the legal and political sphere 
to the moral requirement of a cosmopolitan constitution. In other words, although the 
problem of the humans progress cannot be solved immediately by direct experience, 
only through the experience it is possible to find evidences of this advancement.  
In accordance with the suggestion of the philosopher of Königsberg, this dissertation 
seeks through a ‘cosmopolitan reading’ of some significant case-studies, not only to 
offer some arguments in support of the political inclusion but also to demonstrate that 
the plan for a Cosmopolitan Democracy is already an on-going evolutionary process 
shaping in some way the norms and practices of contemporary global politics. In this 
sense, this thesis has covered a large historical time-frame. In this context, the 
theoretical run of the international relations theory has been touched together with 
three main moments of its concrete application. This description documents the 
constant strengthening of the rule of law and the principles of democracy at the 
international level until the codification of a system which in itself encompasses the 
premises of a global constitution. At the same time, the rights of men have been 
secured even outside the state-borders through the implementation of an extended 
                      
263 146Archibugi, footnote n. 7,  pp. 262-
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Human Rights regime. Furthermore, there are recent proofs that the public attention 
on the world issues is increasing. The mass demonstrations which took place during 
the 1999 and 2001 G8 meeting in Seattle and Genoa, together with the public protests 
that have spread around Europe in 2003 against the US military intervention in Iraq, 
ide the main normative question is how to fill the gap between morality and 
as well as the recent demonstration in London against the G20 and the current 
economic crisis, are significant in this sense. In fact, as Archibugi suggested, “despite 
[that] there is a tendency to exaggerate the citizens’ involvement in matters that do not 
concern directly their own political community,” these events demonstrate that “it is 
growing a feeling of affiliation to a planetary community that has assumed a political 
dimension.”147 Yet, as the same author denounced, in similar occasions “it is 
uncertain what are the purposes of both the summit meetings and the anti-summit 
movements“ and, still now, on the side of the so-called global movements, “the 
protest prevails on the proposal.”148 If the path towards a global society has still to be 
accomplished, the same contemporary political international system cannot be 
regarded as satisfactory. The guiding-principles of democracy are in fact far from 
informing its government. In particular, the democratic deficit is felt on the side of the 
individuals who have no means to make their voice directly eared in the rooms of the 
international power.  
Here the second remark of Kant and Archibugi becomes relevant. In other words, an 
answer to the problem of the further fulfillment of an incomplete commitment is 
required. According to Kant, the individuals takes this obligation as a moral 
requirement. For Archibugi, it is both the coherence toward and the survival of a 
system, the democratic one, that first to be political is a system of live and thought, 
which asks for a general re-thinking of the international schemas. Thus, if on the 
Kantian s
politics, Archibugi asks to conceptualize new democratic forms of power management 
appropriate for the new global context. However, in both cases the individuals and the 
law are at the centre. Hence, Kant’s idea of a progress of the human gender discloses 
a run whose degree of success in approaching its final purpose, the perfect civil 
unification of humankind, is reflected in the quality of the changes set in the legal and 
normative order. Particularly for what is of significance in this dissertation, this means 
to adjust the latter to fit a cosmopolitan global institutional asset which provides for 
                                                 
147Ibid., p.265 
148Archibugi, footnote n.2, p.334 
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the respect of the people’s cosmopolitan right. In this sense, this thesis has endangered 
the proposal of reform of the current global governance system advanced by the 
advocates of Cosmopolitan Democracy. Their idea encompasses changes, in 
democratic terms, of norms and procedures of traditional political and economic 
world institutions, recognized status for no-governmental subjects, as well as the 
establishment of new stages for the global representation of the interests of human 
beings.  
Many counter-assertions have been raised against this project and its presumptions. In 
conclusion, we address three main stands of these critiques. The first category of 
objections regards Cosmopolitan Democracy as mere idealism. In this category, the 
realist theorists sustain that power and self-interest are, in the end, the main regulative 
elements of international relations. As consequence, any project of democratization 
and popular participation at the international level is destined to remain the utopian 
account of a world which is never to come149. Yet, new actors are currently coming 
on the stage of world politics and this enrichment puts at risk the sustainability of the 
realist conclusions. The multiplication of the actors turned, in fact, into a 
diversification of the goals and instances which denies the central realist paradigm of 
the state as the unique actor of world politics150. Looking at the global panorama in 
these terms, it is then no more correct the statement that the main international actors 
rely on power and are contrary to the democratic global governance. It is rather much 
more correct to say that “there are contrasting interests” some pushing for the 
concentration of power in few hands and others that ask for a larger participation151.  
The inapplicability of the plans of Cosmopolitan Democracy is often charged by the 
realist thought to the world hegemonic role taken nowadays by the US in the political, 
economic and military ambit. In this respect, the two approaches share a common 
consciousness of both this predominant force and the risks that this would be used not 
for the general common good. Yet, their positions split on the answer to this 
recognized puzzle. Realists rely upon the further strengthening of the principle of 
sovereignty and the enforcement of a policy of alliances, even between heterogeneous 
regimes, to re-establish the balance of powers. But, As Archibugi noticed, the failure 
of the coalition of varied states which opposed against the US-war on Iraq in 2003 
seems to deny the efficacy of such strategies. At the same time, in the course of 
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history the principle of sovereignty has been used more by the state-governments for 
maintaining their internal power than by the weaker states to defend against the 
stronger. If we add that the domestic control of the order granted by the notion of 
                                                
sovereignty has been often endorsed by the state with violent means at the expense of 
the population, the realist counter-hegemonic project does not appear in the end 
particularly profitable. In contrast, the action of authoritative global institutions would 
have had a stronger effect. It would have faced the problem of the Iraq-war on the 
base of an established and shared legal system prompted to solve these situation in a 
more comprehensive manner, dealing with the problem of both Iraq internal 
democratization and the US external aggression. At the same time, the idea of 
Cosmopolitan Democracy of giving international voice and direct influence in the 
world decisions to other actors different from the states, may guarantee a strong 
counter-force against the concentration of power. In fact, Archibugi states, “if [the] 
interests” that has to be represented “come from who has lesser power, [these] are 
necessarily anti-hegemonic” and, as such, “better protected in a system in which the 
power is distributed among several institutions”. The will of guaranteeing such 
representation is in the end a question of political choice and not at all a pure exercise 
of consolatory fantasies152.  
The second order of complains refer to the estimated timing of the concrete realization 
of an asset in line with the provisions of Cosmopolitan Democracy. In other words, 
the project of Cosmopolitan Democracy would be a too-demanding plan for a man of 
our time and probably even of our closer future generations. It would been needed for 
its effective implementation of a maturation of the political circumstances which 
would required a two extended time period. On the other hand, as Keynes repeated, in 
other contexts, “in the long run we are all dead” and a plan that does not attach 
concretely to the contemporary circumstances is only an illusory option. In this 
respect, Robert Dahl seems skeptical on the possibility of extending the constitutive 
principles of democracy to the international institutions153. Yet, this set of objections 
seem to mislead the idea of Cosmopolitan Democracy since they underestimate the 
progressive character of this approach and the flexibility of its institutional 
conceptualization. In this sense, Cosmopolitan Democracy asks for working out new 
forms of application of the democratic principles of government. What is requested 
 
152Ibid. 
153Robert A. Dahl, ‘Is Post-national Democracy Possible?’ in Sergio Fabbrini, Nation, Federalism and 
Democracy, Compositori (ed.), Trento, 2001. 
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are effective democratic models suitable with the new globalize context rather than 
the mere application of domestic solutions out of the borders. At the same time, in the 
hard cases the ideal solution stated by Cosmopolitan Democracy may be subjected to 
a certain degree of compromise to meet the particular difficulties of the concrete 
circumstances. This would allow the advancement of puzzling situations though 
intermediated levels of democratization while further developments are waited for the 
complete realization of the democratic ideal. In this terms may be interpreted, for 
example, the proposals of the Italian ambassador Paolo Fulci for the enlargement of 
the UN Security Council. In 1994, he suggested to create a new category of ten seats, 
elected by the General Assembly and assigned according to a mechanism of ‘frequent 
is way 
least yet155. In this respect, Cosmopolitan Democracy is often accused of circularity 
                                 
rotation’. These seats would have been reserved to a group of twenties countries 
chosen among the most populous nations and the major financial contributors of the 
organization. At the same time, the remaining ten seats would have been available for 
the weaker states. In 1997, Fulci modified this project proposing further to reserve  
one of the new seats (five or more in this revised version) to the EU. The seat would 
have been occupied by each European members at rotation154. In the context of the 
quarrel here at sake, Pulci’s proposals illustrate how is concretely possible to move 
toward the position of Cosmopolitan Democracy, even in hard questions as the 
problem of the Security Council enlargement, though a process by degrees. Th
of proceeding as a double advantage. In the short period, even if at a minimal stage, it 
allows to get the goal of extending the right of political participation of the interested-
actors. While, in the long-run, it helps to get familiar with possible future further 
reforms. For example, in the case of the Security Council, the elimination of the right 
of veto granted to the five permanent-members and the total eligibility of all the 
Council members.                                
The final set of critiques affirm that a cosmopolitan democracy could not be really 
democratic because actually there is no global demos. Indeed, an adhesion of world 
individuals comparable with that existing in the domestic realms does not exist, at 
                
ocracy, Transnational Institutions, and the Circumstances of Politics’, in Bruce Morrison, 
ritical and Comparative Perspective, Ashgate Publishing, 2004, pp.173-
154Andrea De Guttry and Fabrizio Pagani, Le Nazioni Unite, il Mulino, Bologna, 2005, pp.153 and 
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because a sense that the world constitutes a community is required before a global 
democracy could be effective, yet such a sense is unlikely to emerge in the absence of 
ecause in many occasions the 
stitution have created the demos. This was the case, for example, of the US where a 
pecific political order has shaped the nature of the American identity.  
urthermore, the same basic definition of what constitutes a demos is not univocal 
ecause there is no agreement on a set of shared elements defining with certainty what 
akes a multitude of persons a demos. If we base on general ideas of links of 
olidarity and mutual recognition of common characters, then, nowadays a 
ommunity is not necessarily confined within defined territorial borders. 
onsequently, to draw simply a strong correlation between a people and a community 
istinguished on a rigid territorial standard is no more the best way to take account of 
e needs of those persons. It is often repeated against Cosmopolitan Democracy that 
 global demos does not exist and that even though it were real not necessarily this 
ould be interested in the world matters. In the doubt, we continue to believe that it 
ould be more appropriate to guarantee the people’s chance of expressing their own 
pinion rather than giving for granted their apathy.       
                                              
some kind of global democracy. Contemporary liberal democracies emerged from 
pre-democratic state structures, by analogy, it is sustained, global democracy would 
require the existence of a global state-structure that could be democratized156.  
For what concern this last aspect, in the course of this thesis, we have attempted to 
illustrate three main moments of the international history which, after Westphalia, 
have represented the arrangement given, in different epochs, to the relations between 
states. This assets have not been the expression of isolated circumstances, but, rather, 
the result of a cumulative process of learning which from the idea of ‘collective 
security’ has led exactly to an embryonic form of global political arrangement157.      
With respect to the accuse of circularity, although in many cases a sentiment of 
adhesion and recognition of a defined set of people has preceded their civil union, this 
process has not to be intended in an absolute way, b
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